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THE COPYMARK CREEP: HOW THE 
NORMATIVE STANDARDS OF FAN 
COMMUNITIES CAN RESCUE COPYRIGHT 
Stacey M. Lantagne 
ABSTRACT 
Copyrighted works are increasingly perceived by society as 
serving a purpose traditionally considered to be held by trademarks. 
Copyrighted works act as valuable brands within a consumer 
marketplace, protected as corporate assets and defined to protect 
commercial interests. This Article argues that the growing overlap 
between copyright and trademark has resulted in a “copymark creep,” 
evident in the judicial decisions that have confronted the issues. 
This overlap has tipped the balance away from copyright’s 
purported constitutional goal. Copyright is understood to benefit the 
public by providing a public domain and protecting certain free 
speech rights, whereas the trademarking of copyright chips away at 
both of those benefits. The lack of bright line rules in the copyright 
arena only adds to the uncertainty and leads to the stifling of more 
speech, at further detriment to the public. 
This Article proposes that the solution to this problem can be 
found on the Internet through fan communities. Fan communities 
employ bright line rules to create a system that is clearer than that 
found in the judicial precedents, rather than the anything goes 
anarchy they are frequently perceived as. These communities have 
instinctively turned toward trademark protections in the copyright 
context, relying on disclaimers to dispel confusion and on a lack of 
commercialism to shelter them from infringement attacks. This 
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importation of benchmarks more strongly associated with trademark 
law both acknowledges the overall copymark creep and finds a way 
to preserve copyright’s goals in the face of the creep, resulting in a 
flourishing creative community. Finally, fan communities use these 
benchmarks to set bright line rules for themselves that encourage 
speech that might otherwise be hesitant in the face of legal 
uncertainty. 
If we are going to continually expand copyright law, we should at 
least be careful to check it with those doctrines we use to keep 
trademark from swallowing the cultural dialogue. Such an impulse is 
the only one that makes sense to preserve the effectiveness of 
copyright as a method of encouraging creativity. Otherwise, we run 
the risk of using copyright as merely a backstop to trademark law and 
lose sight of its different overall goal: to encourage creativity, not 
commercial gain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright is a statutory scheme authorized by the Constitution to 
promote progress by providing ownership in certain creative works.1 
The brief, simple directive set forth by the Intellectual Property 
Clause of the Constitution has led to a morass of overlapping statutes 
that seek to strike a continually elusive balance between the rights of 
the creator, to prevent others from using a creative work, and the 
rights of the public, to engage with that creative work.2 At its heart, 
copyright seeks to regulate the creative marketplace by giving some 
                                                                                                                 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2. See id. 
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limited benefit to the few copyright holders to ultimately benefit of 
the public at large. 
Trademark law is a statutory scheme used to aid effective and 
efficient consumer purchasing decisions. One of the many ornaments 
dangling off the justifying branch of the Constitution’s Commerce 
Clause, trademark law protects valuable symbols to clarify the 
clamor of the competitive economy. At its heart, trademark seeks to 
regulate the commercial marketplace by giving some limited benefit 
to the few trademark holders to ultimately benefit the public at large. 
In the abstract, having one system to deal with goods and services 
and another system to deal with creative endeavors makes conceptual 
sense. In practice, however, copyright and trademark have spilled 
into each other to such an extent that attempts to disentangle the two 
legal schemes have only led to muddled judicial decisions and 
imprecision. The growing overlap between copyright and trademark 
law leaves the public with little guidance as to how to enjoy the 
benefits supposedly provided to them under both systems, tipping the 
balance too much toward the rights holders.3 
The Internet is frequently blamed for the confused state of the 
copyright system. However, it is copyright holders who have caused 
much of the blurring between copyright and trademark, by 
increasingly treating their copyrighted works more like trademarks 
and seeking an expansion of their copyright monopolies through 
trademark law concepts.4 In the face of the resulting confusion this 
“copymark” idea has left in the legal system, the folk wisdom of fan 
communities on the Internet actually stands as a beacon of clarity. 
Far from threatening the copyright system, the bright line rules that 
fan communities have frequently adopted should be embraced for re-
establishing the intended balance of copyright and trademark. 
                                                                                                                 
 3. See infra Part I. 
 4. See infra Part I.D. 
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I. THE INTERACTION OF COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK LAW 
A. The Traditional Justifications for Two Separate Systems 
In the beginning, there were two systems under two different 
Constitutional clauses dealing with two different things in two 
different ways: trademark and copyright.5 Historically, the difference 
between these two seemed so clear-cut as to be obvious. 
1. The Trademark Law Regime 
Traditionally, trademark was a doctrine used to protect consumer 
brands.6 Its Congressional authority is rooted in the Commerce 
Clause.7 Trademark was meant to assist corporations in marketing 
themselves and to aid consumers in making efficient buying 
decisions.8 Trademark law is all about the marketplace and selling 
goods in fair and profitable ways.9 
The Lanham Act that governs trademark law “was intended . . . ’to 
protect persons engaged in . . . commerce against unfair 
competition.’”10 It was “not designed to protect originality or 
creativity”11 and “should not be stretched to cover matters that are 
typically of no consequence to purchasers.”12 Rather, its purpose is to 
“reduce[] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing 
decisions” and ensure that the right company “will reap the financial, 
reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.”13 
                                                                                                                 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 6. See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping 
Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1488–89 (2004). 
 7. Id. at 1488. 
 8. Id. at 1488–89 (“[F]ederal trademark law seeks to protect consumers by allowing product- and 
producer-differentiation that reduces the risk of consumer confusion and lowers search costs.”). 
 9. See id. at 1488–89, 1494–1500. 
 10. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 (2003) (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127 (1999)); see also Michael Todd Helfand, Note, When Mickey Mouse is as Strong as Superman: 
The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 623, 637 (1992) (“[T]rademarks benefit not only their owners, but consumers who 
rely on identification of the sponsoring or producing business entity.”). 
 11. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. 
 12. Id. at 33; see also Meyer v. Rodex Sales & Servs., LLC, No. CV 05-176-S-MHW, 2006 WL 
3355004, at *9 (D. Idaho Nov. 16, 2006). 
 13. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995). 
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Therefore, trademark law is largely unconcerned with what happens 
to the good once it is sold.14 
2. The Copyright Law Regime 
Copyright, on the other hand, was considered to be totally 
different. After all, if it was not, there would have been no need for 
the Lanham Act in the first place.15 Copyright law is a tense balance 
between the rights of the creator and the rights of the public to 
engage with creative works.16 As opposed to the commercial 
emphasis of trademark law, copyright law is concerned with 
creativity.17 Rooted in the Intellectual Property Clause of the 
Constitution,18 copyright law was intended to encourage creative 
works for the good of society at large, establishing an incentive 
structure.19 This incentive structure would “motivate the creative 
activity of authors and inventors”20 to ensure the “optimal level” of 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp., 419 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 15. See Andrea Pacelli, Who Owns the Key to the Vault? Hold-up, Lock-out, and Other Copyright 
Strategies, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1229, 1261–62 (2008). 
 16. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1476–77 (“Congress has passed numerous statutes creating 
copyright . . . rights, in each case attempting to achieve a balance between the rights granted to the 
creators and inventors and the benefits to the public, and in each case attempting to provide a sufficient 
incentive for the production of new works.”); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical 
Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 342 (2006); Joseph A. Lavigne, For 
Limited Times? Making Rich Kids Richer Via the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. 
MERCY L. REV. 311, 316 (1996); Joseph P. Liu, The New Public Domain, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1395, 
1399–1400 (2013); Douglas Campbell Rennie, This Book is a Movie: The Faithful Adaptation as a 
Benchmark for Analyzing the Substantial Similarity of Works in Different Media, 93 OR. L. REV. 49, 54 
(2014); Edward C. Walterscheid, Defining the Patent and Copyright Term: Term Limits and the 
Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 315, 394 (2000); Jacqueline Lai Chung, Note, 
Drawing Idea from Expression: Creating a Legal Space for Culturally Appropriated Literary 
Characters, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 938 (2007). 
 17. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. 
 18. See Moffat, supra note 6, at 1488. 
 19. Nicholas B. Lewis, Comment, Shades of Grey: Can the Copyright Fair Use Defense Adapt to 
New Re-contextualized Forms of Music and Art?, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 267, 280 (2005) (“[T]he goal of 
copyright is public enrichment, based on providing incentives for artists to create new works . . . .”); 
Arewa, supra note 16, at 343; Patrick R. Goold, Why the U.K. Adaptation Right is Superior to the U.S. 
Derivative Work Right, 92 NEB. L. REV. 843, 888 (2014); Kathryn M. Foley, Note, Protecting Fictional 
Characters: Defining the Elusive Trademark-Copyright Divide, 41 CONN. L. REV. 921, 924 (2009); 
Allison Hollows, Comment, Who Owns the Athlete?: The Application of the Transformative Use Test in 
the Right of Publicity Context, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 285, 301 (2015); Moffat, supra note 6, at 1475, 
1476–77. 
 20. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. 
6
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol32/iss2/4
2016] THE COPYMARK CREEP 465 
“production of valuable, remunerative, and socially beneficial new 
works.”21 “What we want . . . is to assist authors in earning just 
enough profit to, first, enhance the creative environment enough to 
stimulate them to create works in the first place, and, second, 
encourage them to make their works available to us.”22 This is why 
copyright encourages the growth of a public domain of freely 
available works.23 In fact, “[t]he ultimate purpose of . . . copyrights in 
the United States is to enlarge the public domain of creative works by 
authors and inventors, thereby promoting ‘the progress of science and 
useful arts.’”24 
The Copyright Act originally concerned books, maps, and charts25; 
it later expanded to music, movies, and television shows.26 The Act, 
however, never seemed to be primarily about selling goods so much 
as that was just a side effect to the primary benefit of encouraging the 
creation of such works. 
3. The Differences in Practice 
“Congress enacted the copyright and trademark statutes to protect 
different types of intellectual property and redress different types of 
harm.”27 The temptation to conflate the two may always have been 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1479; see also Goold, supra note 19, at 888 (“[W]ithout copyright 
protection, it is arguable that the number of works created would decrease to a sub-optimal level.”); 
Lavigne, supra note 16, at 316 (“Copyright is essentially a provision of monopolistic protection for 
authors as an incentive for them to produce creative works for the public good.”); Edward C. 
Walterscheid, The Remarkable—and Irrational—Disparity Between the Patent Term and the Copyright 
Term, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 233, 241 (2001). 
 22. Jessica Litman, Mickey Mouse Emeritus: Character Protection and the Public Domain, 11 U. 
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 429, 434 (1994). 
 23. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1481; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 429; Foley, supra note 19, at 924. 
 24. Walterscheid, supra note 21, at 239; see also, e.g., Litman, supra note 22, at 433. 
 25. Christopher Buccafusco & Paul J. Heald, Do Bad Things Happen When Works Enter the Public 
Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 6 (2013). 
 26. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 27. Zuffa, LLC v. Justin.tv, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1104 (D. Nev. 2012); accord EMI Catalogue 
P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2000); Waldman 
Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994); Bach v. Forever Living Prods. U.S., Inc., 
473 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2007) (“Trademark and copyright law have fundamentally 
different purposes.”); Lee B. Burgunder, The Scoop on Betty Boop: A Proposal to Limit Overreaching 
Trademarks, 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 257, 269 (2012); Foley, supra note 19, at 953 (“[T]he nature of 
the rights conferred by copyright and trademark are substantially different . . . .”); Liu, supra note 16, at 
1428; Pacelli, supra note 15, at 1260; J.C. Sander, The End of Arbitrary Findings of Secondary 
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there, as they both deal with word, sound, and image based methods 
of creativity. Additionally, trademark law is expansive in its breadth, 
allowing anything to be considered a trademark as long as it is 
capable of carrying meaning28: an incredibly broad definition that 
dovetails nicely with copyright’s protection of expression, and also 
something that carries meaning. 
However, the different justifications and resulting bodies of law 
seemed initially to make it easy to distinguish between the two.29 For 
one thing, while trademarks require commercial use to be protected,30 
copyright operates to protect even private diary entries designed 
never to be marketed at all.31 Indeed, copyright law sometimes 
operates to protect the owner’s right to withdraw entirely from the 
marketplace.32 Despite their surface similarity, copyright and 
trademark have sometimes been in tension with each other.33 
B. The Growing Overlap Between Copyright and Trademark 
While initially the two realms of copyright and trademark seemed 
clearly separate, the realm of copyright has begun to look much more 
like the realm of trademark. 
1. The Length of Protection 
Where once copyright was limited in a manner similar to patent 
laws, copyright terms have expanded outward so far that, to the 
                                                                                                                 
Meaning: A Call for the Expansion of Trademark Status of Literary Characters, 17 INTELL. PROP. L. 
BULL. 1, 21 (2012) (“This coexistence of trademark and copyright laws should not be that big of a 
problem, as they each deal with protecting different things.”). 
 28. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995). 
 29. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1475 (“Historically, patent, copyright, and trademark law protected very 
different types of works; the three areas of law occupied three separate realms and there was little or no 
overlap between them.”); see also Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[T]he nature of the property right conferred by copyright is significantly different 
from that of trademark . . . .”). 
 30. 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16:1 (4th 
ed. 1996). 
 31. See New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 593 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 32. See, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 33. See, e.g., Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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average person, the term may as well be infinite.34 Copyright terms 
are defined by life, which practically guarantees that no one, other 
than the original creator, can culturally engage with the works being 
produced during our lifetimes, and that are arguably most relevant to 
us, because we will be dead by the time they enter the public 
domain.35 This lengthy term looks far more like the indefinite term of 
trademark than it does the extremely short term for patents. 
2. Corporate Ownership 
Most copyrights today are owned by corporations, not creators.36 
Indeed, the prevalence of the work-for-hire doctrine,37 permitting 
corporations to directly be considered “authors” for purposes of 
copyright law,38 illustrates to what extent copyright is understood to 
be a corporate asset. The concept of treating corporations as authors 
for copyright purposes is foreign under the copyright structure of 
most other countries.39 Corporate ownership of copyright, therefore, 
is not intuitive to copyright. Rather, it appears to be a reaction to the 
growing use of copyright in a trademark sense by corporations in the 
marketplace.40 
                                                                                                                 
 34. Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual 
Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1499 (2002); Joshua Saval, Comment, Copyrights, Trademarks, and 
Terminations: How Limiting Comic Book Characters in the Film Industry Reflects on Future 
Intellectual Property Issues for Character Law, 9 FIU L. REV. 405, 431 (2014). Indeed, commentators 
have noted that copyright has been expanded twice for the benefit of the same group of copyright 
holders, giving the impression to them that the benefit could be infinitely expandable. See Lavigne, 
supra note 16, at 350–51. 
 35. See Liu, supra note 16, at 1426 (“The extremely long term of copyright protection already means 
that the concrete benefits of the public domain are relatively diffuse. Most individuals are vaguely aware 
of a public domain, but think of these works in relatively remote terms (e.g., Shakespeare, classical 
music, etc.).”). 
 36. See Scott M. Martin, The Mythology of the Public Domain: Exploring the Myths Behind Attacks 
on the Duration of Copyright Protection, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 253, 280 (2002) (noting the debate over 
how much the system “benefits corporations at the expense of authors”); Arewa, supra note 16, at 318. 
 37. See, e.g., RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 4:3, Westlaw (database 
updated Sept. 2015); Judith A. Silver, Note, A Bad Dream: In Search of a Legal Framework for 
Copyright Infringement Claims Involving Digital Imagery in Motion Pictures, 35 IDEA 407, 411–12 
(1995). 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012). 
 39. See Martin, supra note 36, at 282–83. 
 40. See id. at 280. 
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3. Copyright as Brands 
A consequence of corporate ownership is that a copyright is 
frequently a corporate asset used for selling in the marketplace, much 
like a trademark.41 While the ability to license copyright no doubt 
inspires some creativity, a copyright is more generally understood, by 
public and copyright holders alike, as a branding tool.42 The 
American Marketing Association explains that “[a] brand is a 
‘[n]ame, term, design, symbol, or any other feature that identifies one 
seller’s good or service as distinct from those of other sellers.’”43 
While this sounds similar to the definition of a trademark,44 many 
copyright holders use the term brand when referring to their 
copyrighted properties.45 
For example, a recent controversy erupted over a violent fan film 
based on the Power Rangers characters.46 The maker of the film 
argued that it was fair use, but the Power Rangers copyright holders 
were concerned about the video, not because it was infringing 
copyright necessarily, but because it might negatively impact their 
“brand”: “[Y]ou can’t take a brand like this and reboot it so dark and 
gritty. This is still a kids’ brand.”47 The Power Ranger copyright 
holders were planning to produce a movie and were clearly 
concerned that the arguably fair use video would harm them; not 
because it was substantially similar to their very different 
copyrighted products, but because it might tarnish what they were 
doing48—a trademark law concept.49 
In the same vein, many “news agencies use trademarks at the 
beginning or end of an article to distinguish and reinforce their 
                                                                                                                 
 41. See, e.g., Pacelli, supra note 15, at 1255–56. 
 42. See id. at 1249. 
 43. Dictionary, AM. MARKETING ASS’N., https://www.ama.org/resources/Pages/Dictionary.aspx 
?dLetter=B (last visited Nov. 9, 2015). 
 44. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
 45. See, e.g., B. Alan Orange, ‘Power Rangers’ Fan Film Returns After Copyright Dispute, 
MOVIEWEB (Feb. 28, 2015), http://www.movieweb.com/power-rangers-movie-fan-film-banned-online. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Id. (quoting Jason David Frank, a former Power Ranger). 
 48. See id. 
 49. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012). 
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brand.”50 The “brand,” of course, that they are seeking to protect here 
is in fact their news articles—traditionally the subject of copyright.51 
But their desire to use the commercial doctrines of trademark law to 
attempt to protect their copyright is understandable: “Journalistic 
content might not be a ‘good’ or product in the traditional sense, but 
it is most certainly a commercialized product. Garnering goodwill 
with the public thus is of supreme importance.”52 
Explicitly reflecting the brand understanding of copyrighted 
works, copyright holders have frequently begun to trademark titles of 
movies, titles of books, works of art, and even the names of 
characters.53 In this way, copyright law has come to seem more 
consumer goodwill driven (like trademark) than expression driven 
(like traditionally copyright).54 Copyright holders propose the same 
idea in multiple iterations, “rebooting” franchises frequently, in a 
way that relies heavily on consumer recognition of the brand in 
question.55 
4. The Lack of Unified Treatment within Copyright Statutes 
The jumbled state of the copyright statutory scheme, with its 
inconsistent view on what is and is not a copyright, has added to the 
confusion. The legal definition of “copyright” has been challenged by 
increasingly regulatory statutes, like the Digital Millennium 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Matthew Novaria, Note, Piracy of Online News: A “Moral Rights” Approach to Protecting a 
Journalist’s Right of Attribution and Right of Integrity, 24 DEPAUL J. ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 
295, 313 (2014). 
 51. See, e.g., Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537, 541–42 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 52. Novaria, supra note 50, at 313. 
 53. See Eriq Gardner, ‘Twilight’ Producer Facing Possible Trial this Month for Interfering on 
Parody, HOLLYWOOD REP. (NOV. 13, 2014, 3:08 PM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-
esq/twilight-producer-facing-trial-month-748852. Indeed, some people have started trademarking 
statements they have used to answer questions, signalling just how valuable merchandising has become. 
See Darren Rovell, Lynch Seeks “I’m Just Here” Trademark, ESPN.COM (Feb. 23, 2015), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/12371993/marshawn-lynch-seattle-seahawks-files-trademark-super-
bowl-media-day-quote. 
 54. See Gardner, supra note 53; Rovell, supra note 53. 
 55. See Foley, supra note 19, at 937; Goold, supra note 19, at 883–84; Courtney Enlow, Eff It, Let’s 
Just Reboot Everything: 10 More Shows We Should Drag Out of the Grave, PAJIBA (Apr. 8, 2015), 
http://www.pajiba.com/miscellaneous/eff-it-just-reboot-everything-10-more-shows-we-should-drag-out-
of-the-grave.php. 
11
Lantagne: The Copymark Creep
Published by Reading Room, 2016
470 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
Copyright Act (the “DMCA”)56 that define what can and cannot be 
copyrighted based on narrow, specific situations, at times apparently 
using the newness of developing technologies to overturn accepted 
jurisprudence on what is protectable and what is permissible.57 As 
such, although copyright’s delineated bundle of rights does not 
include a “right of attribution,”58 commentators have suggested that 
the DMCA confers a “de facto” one.59 Other commentators have 
noted that the DMCA can operate to limit use of works in the public 
domain, which would have been free to use under traditional 
copyright law.60 Other proposed statutes, like the You Own Devices 
Act,61 have been regarded as trying to prevent “copyright mind 
tricks” from being employed.62 
C. The Creation of the Concept of “Copymark” 
Given the ways in which copyright has come to seem more like it 
is protecting something similar to trademark, copyright holders have 
tried to use trademark law to add protection to their copyrighted 
works.63 Copyright holders are understandably attempting to broaden 
their copyright monopoly, so they treat trademark law as an 
                                                                                                                 
 56. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–22 (2012). Indeed, although the statute has “copyright” in its 
title, commentators have noted that it has been used “as a competitive weapon for purposes that had 
essentially nothing to do with [copyright objectives], but more to do with the prevention of 
competition.” Arewa, supra note 16, at 292. 
 57. See Edward Lee, Warming up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 1466 
(2008). 
 58. Michael Landau & Donna K. Lewis, Issues and Best Practices in Connection with Educational 
Resources and Other Materials in the “Cloud”, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 627, 
664–65 (2014). 
 59. Novaria, supra note 50, at 314–15. 
 60. See Liu, supra note 16, at 1454. 
 61. H.R. 862, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 62. Jeff Roberts, “YODA law” would ensure devices can be resold free of copyright, GIGAOM (Feb. 
11, 2015, 10:42 AM PST), https://gigaom.com/2015/02/11/yoda-law-would-ensure-devices-can-be-
resold-free-of-copyright/. 
 63. See, e.g., EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 63 
(2d Cir. 2000); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000); Nat’l 
Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951); Galerie Furstenberg v. 
Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Helfand, supra note 10, at 623, 641; Alex Kozinski, 
Mickey & Me, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 465, 467–68 (1994); Zahr K. Said, Fixing 
Copyright in Characters: Literary Perspectives on a Legal Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 769, 773 
(2013). 
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expansive doctrine that might compensate them for damage that 
might not otherwise be recognized by copyright law.64 In this way, 
copyright holders have come to encourage a way of thinking about 
copyright that is a blend between copyright and trademark: a 
“copymark” idea. 
1. The Copymark Creep 
Copyright holders have attempted to expand their copyright 
monopoly by borrowing from trademark law concepts.65 Where 
copyright law leaves gaps that cause copyright holders to feel 
exposed, they turn to trademark law for extra protection.66 In this 
way, trademark law has been used in the name of expanding the 
copyright monopoly.67 This is especially alluring in cases where a 
copyright has expired,68 but is by no means limited to such 
situations.69 Similarly, in application to situations it was not 
originally intended for, the scope of trademark protection itself has 
greatly expanded beyond its original intentions.70 
                                                                                                                 
 64. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Kamar Indus., Inc., No. H-82-2377, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
15942, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 20, 1982) (finding two lines of dialogue copyrighted based not on 
copyright standards like originality and creativity but rather on consumer understanding that the lines 
were “readily recognizable to the lay observer as key lines of dialogue”); Gershwin v. Whole Thing Co., 
No. CV 80-569, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16465, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1980) (discussing the 
trademark harm of goodwill in the context of copyright infringement); Michael Abramowicz, A Theory 
of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doctrines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 334 (2005) (raising the 
possibility “that judges protect characters and plots based on some intuitive sense that reusing them 
amounts to misappropriation” rather than relying on strictures of copyright law in their decisions); 
Sander, supra note 27, at 2. 
 65. Sander, supra note 27, at 1–2. 
 66. See, e.g., Saval, supra note 34, at 422–23. 
 67. See Moffat, supra note 6, at 1496 (“[T]rademark law now protects a wide variety of ‘product 
identifiers’ in circumstances hardly imaginable a hundred years ago.”); Helfand, supra note 10, at 652 
(“Unchecked, it expands the scope of exclusive rights of copyright . . . .”). In some circumstances, the 
copyright holder only has a trademark argument to make based on the copyright protection it received, 
meaning that “the monopoly granted during the copyright term served only to facilitate the copyright 
owner’s development of . . . trademark protection, and the public receives nothing in exchange for the 
grant of a copyright monopoly.” Foley, supra note 19, at 957; Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales 
Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Pacelli, supra note 15, at 1259, 1263–64. 
 68. See Comedy III, 200 F.3d at 595. 
 69. See EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 
2000); Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951); Galerie 
Furstenberg v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 70. See Moffat, supra note 6, at 1494; Litman, supra note 22, at 430; Liu, supra note 16, at 1428. 
Indeed, the attempt to “hybridize” intellectual property regimes goes both ways, as trademark holders 
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Influenced by the ways in which copyright and trademark were 
beginning to blur, courts began discussing them in overlapping 
terms.71 For instance, in a Ninth Circuit case involving Mickey 
Mouse, the court used a traditional trademark test in deciding the 
copyright cause of action.72 The Second Circuit has similarly 
conflated copyright and trademark, discussing trademark likelihood 
of confusion in the context of its copyright substantial similarity 
analysis.73 Some of the leading cases have therefore blurred the 
copyright and trademark lines.74 
The interplay of characters acting as both trademarks and as 
copyrighted entities is one of the areas where copymark creep is most 
visible. In an early case involving copyrighted comic strips, a court 
refused to view the comic strips as functioning like trademarks: “In 
the case of these silly pictures nobody cares who is the producer—
least of all, children who are the chief readers—; the ‘strips’ sell 
because they amuse and please, and they amuse and please because 
they are what they are, not because they come from ‘Detective.’”75 
These copyrighted comic strips, the court found, were successful 
because of their creativity, not because they indicated a single source 
in the way that a trademark might.76 
Copyright holders continued to raise the issue, however, probably 
because they were treating their copyrighted materials as 
trademarks.77 So, Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) asserted 
both copyright and trademark protection in not only the characters, 
but also in a variety of other features of the Amos ‘n’ Andy radio 
shows, including some dialogue.78 The court made no ruling on 
                                                                                                                 
will also seek to backstop their trademark protection with copyright protection. See, e.g., Murray Hill 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. ABC Commc’ns, Inc., 264 F.3d 622, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 71. Said, supra note 63, at 773 (“[B]ecause courts have not historically paid enough attention to the 
differences between [copyright and trademark law], the case law has evolved in a doctrinally haphazard 
fashion.”); Foley, supra note 19, at 945 (referring to a “less coherent line of cases that often commingled 
trademark and copyright principles”). 
 72. See Helfand, supra note 10, at 646. 
 73. See id. at 650. 
 74. See sources cited supra note 64. 
 75. Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Silverman v. CBS Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 78. Id. 
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whether or not CBS owned valid marks, however, because it found 
that, even if it had, it had abandoned them.79 The court acknowledged 
being influenced in its trademark ruling by the fact that the case also 
had copyright implications, noting that “[i]n the area of artistic 
speech, . . . enforcement of trademark rights carries a risk of 
inhibiting free expression.”80 Other courts, however, became more 
comfortable with the conflation of copyright and trademark law.81 
This is clearly seen in the case of Mickey Mouse,82 possibly the 
most famous copyrighted work to have also gained trademark 
protection. Cases dealing with Mickey Mouse jumble trademark, 
trade dress, and copyright language all together, with little regard to 
the differences between them.83 A court referred to a defendant as 
“exploit[ing], without authorization, established 
trademarks . . . without any copyright license and mimick[ing] 
plaintiff’s well-established trade dress.”84 Throughout the opinion the 
court continued to switch between intellectual property regimes, 
referring to “trademark rights,” “copyright designation[s],” 
“licensee[s],” and even just “Disney’s rights,” with little attempt 
made to differentiate which intellectual property right was actually 
being violated by any given conduct.85 In fact, in one impressive 
paragraph, the court strung together three consecutive sentences 
referring to three different types of intellectual property as if they 
were one and the same: 
Disney’s copyrights in Mickey Mouse and Minnie Mouse 
will be enforced as to exact copies and variations of 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 48 (citing L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 28–29 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 81. See, e.g., DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110 (N.D. Ga. 1984). 
Compare Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding that the 
Superman character deserved copyright protection based on “forty years of development in various 
media,” which sounds more like a testament to trademark use and public recognition), with Detective 
Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 1940) (finding that the plaintiff was “not 
entitled to a monopoly of the mere character of a ‘Superman’ who is a blessing to mankind”). 
 82. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 698 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1988). 
 83. Id. at 11–12. 
 84. Id. at 11. 
 85. Id. at 12. 
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Mickey and Minnie. These variations are classic examples 
of trade dress violations, for Mickey and Minnie have 
acquired not only a secondary meaning, but a meaning of 
great value, favorable in all respects, and well-entrenched 
worldwide. Powell’s free ride on the ingenuity, skillful 
promotion, and resulting public acceptance which Disney 
has rightfully gained from these charming mouse characters 
must come to an end.86 
Plaintiffs sometimes bring both trademark and copyright causes of 
action, which causes the mingling of judicial reasoning.87 In other 
cases, however, the plaintiffs have imported trademark law principles 
into copyright law arguments, without bringing a trademark cause of 
action.88 Some courts have been willing to nebulously expand 
copyright past anything the author has created, referring vaguely to 
“lives in the public imagination that extend far beyond the reach of 
the individual works.”89 One court explicitly gave up trying to 
determine “the precise application of the copyright . . . to each of 
[the] examples.”90 Other courts are drawn to the idea of simply 
calling everything “intellectual property rights”91 or even 
“proprietary interests”92 without sorting through the different 
analyses. This confusion has happened because these decisions, while 
ostensibly concerning copyright, are really about protecting some 
undefined combination of copyright and trademark that could be 
called “copymark.” Some courts also explicitly conflated substantial 
similarity, a copyright doctrine, with likelihood of confusion, a 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Id. 
 87. See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31–32 (2003). 
 88. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., No. 11cv0191-IEG (BLM), 2011 WL 3203117, at 
*7 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (noting that the defendant characterized the plaintiff’s claims as “copyright 
claims disguised as trademark claims”). Parties have, of course, acknowledged this tactic in arguments 
in front of courts. Id. 
 89. DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118 (N.D. Ga. 1984). 
 90. Walt Disney, 698 F. Supp. at 13. 
 91. Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 794 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 92. Id. at 795. 
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trademark doctrine, and provided little explanation as to why those 
two separate doctrines suddenly mean the same thing.93 
This copymark creep extends to the ways in which courts treat 
copyright defenses. Courts have also been willing to use harm “akin 
to that of dilution in trademark law” to find against copyright fair use 
analyses.94 Other courts have gone “through the motions of 
evaluating the statutory fair use factors, yet focused almost entirely 
on the economic value and goodwill . . . , erroneously importing 
trademark principles into the copyright fair use analysis.”95 
2. Dastar 
The Supreme Court’s leading case on the “copymark creep” issue, 
Dastar Corporation v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 
acknowledged the collision of trademark and copyright law 
concepts.96 However, the Dastar holding left many questions in its 
wake which has only increased the muddle of how copyright holders 
view trademark law as a weapon in their arsenal. 
Dastar involved the television series Crusade in Europe, which 
was first broadcast in 1949 and which Fox owned the copyright to.97 
Due to Fox’s failure to comply with the formality requirements 
written into the copyright statute at the time, the copyright in 
Crusade in Europe lapsed, which left the series in the public 
domain.98 Dastar purchased a copy of the public domain television 
series, edited it, and began selling it as part of a series called World 
War II Campaigns in Europe.99 
Fox was less than pleased with this development, but Fox had a 
problem: it no longer owned the copyright in Crusades in Europe. 
Therefore, Fox could not allege that Dastar’s use of the television 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 530 F. Supp. 1187, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
 94. DC Comics, 598 F. Supp. at 118. 
 95. Foley, supra note 19, at 954. 
 96. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). 
 97. Id. at 26. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 26–27. 
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series was infringing in any way.100 Fox then turned to trademark 
law.101 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which governs trademark law, 
contains a cause of action for “reverse passing off.”102 Reverse 
passing off is a cause of action “against a person who use[s] in 
commerce[,] either ‘a false designation of origin, or any false 
description or representation’ in connection with ‘any goods or 
services.’”103 Passing off is placing another’s trademark onto your 
own goods, whereas reverse passing off is placing your trademark 
onto another’s goods.104 The disagreement in Dastar was not over 
mislabeling the goods; it was, in copyright terms, over a failure to 
attribute.105 
The standard for recovery on a reverse passing off claim is the 
trademark linchpin: whether the public is confused.106 In essence, 
Fox’s claim was that Dastar’s use of Fox’s formerly copyrighted 
television series confused people as to who had created the series.107 
As a Lanham Act claim, this is unmistakably a trademark cause of 
action.108 However, under copyright law, Fox’s television series was 
no longer protected at all.109 
The district court was convinced by Fox’s reverse passing off 
argument and awarded Dastar’s profits to Fox.110 The court even 
doubled the award to make sure that Dastar was not tempted to 
“infring[e]” again in the future.111 The problem, of course, was that 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Id. at 26. 
 101. Id. at 27. 
 102. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012). 
 103. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 29 (quoting Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1))). 
 104. MCCARTHY, supra note 30, § 25:4. 
 105. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. 
 106. MCCARTHY supra note 30, § 25:6. 
 107. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 (“[T]he gravamen of respondents’ claim is that, in marketing and selling 
Campaigns as its own product without acknowledging its nearly wholesale reliance on the Crusade 
television series, Dastar has made a ‘false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, 
or false or misleading representation of fact, which . . . is likely to cause confusion . . . as to the 
origin . . . of his or her goods.’”). 
 108. Id. at 32. 
 109. Id. at 31. 
 110. Id. at 28. 
 111. Id. 
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Dastar had not infringed anything at all. Crusade in Europe was in 
the public domain. By definition, formerly copyrighted works 
currently in the public domain cannot be infringed.112 Fox had to turn 
to trademark law because copyright law was of no assistance. If Fox 
wanted to expand its copyright monopoly, it had to do it by importing 
trademark law concepts. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district 
court, finding that Dastar had performed a “bodily appropriation” of 
the television series that constituted reverse passing off and justified 
awarding damages to Fox.113 
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed, starting its analysis with 
the fact that Dastar “took a creative work in the public domain.”114 
But the Supreme Court then veered away from its discussion of the 
public domain nature of the copyrighted work and whether it could 
be lassoed into trademark law, choosing instead to focus on the 
definition of the word “origin” in the reverse passing off statute.115 If 
Fox could be considered the origin of Dastar’s product, even though 
Dastar had been working with a public domain work, the Court 
thought it could still be liable for reverse passing off.116 
Ultimately, the Court decided against Fox on the reverse passing 
off issue.117 The Court did not explicitly cordon off copyright from 
trademark, but rather relied on a precise definition of the word 
“goods.”118 The good at issue in Dastar was not any copyrighted 
work, whether that work might be Crusade in Europe or World War 
II Campaigns in Europe.119 Rather, the good at issue was the physical 
videotape that World War II Campaigns in Europe was contained 
on.120 The videotape at issue originated from Dastar; there was no 
confusion about that, and Fox did not dispute that it had not created 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. at 31–33. 
 113. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28. 
 114. Id. at 31. 
 115. Id. at 31–32. 
 116. Id. at 31. 
 117. Id. at 38. 
 118. Id. at 31–32. 
 119. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31–32. 
 120. Id. at 32. 
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the physical videotape.121 For the Court, that was where the Lanham 
Act’s governance ended.122 
3. “Copymark Creep” post-Dastar 
a. Dastar’s Shortcomings 
Dastar is a curious decision,123 especially notable for its very 
narrow reading of a statute that had formerly been called “a remedial 
provision [that] should be broadly construed.”124 For one, it seems to 
draw a distinction between copyright law and trademark law125 that is 
not quite correct. In the Court’s view, copyright law appears to exist 
to protect nebulous, intangible things.126 But copyright law does not 
protect anything until it is “fixed in [a] tangible medium of 
expression.”127 The concept of something that is protected by 
copyright that is separable from its embodiment in a physical good is 
confusing. Even more problematic, though, copyright emphatically 
does not protect “ideas.”128 The Dastar Court noted that an attempt to 
                                                                                                                 
 121. Id. at 38. 
 122. Id. 
 123. See, e.g., Richard H. Chused, The Legal Culture of Appropriation Art: The Future of Copyright 
in the Remix Age, 17 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 163, 209 n.150 (2014) (“The result in Dastar seems 
wrong to me . . . .”); Liu, supra note 16, at 1431 (“The Court’s opinion is interesting and somewhat odd 
in a number of ways.”). 
 124. Geisel v. Poynter Prods. Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 125. See Liu, supra note 16, at 1431–32. 
 126. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33. 
 127. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
 128. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Copyright law protects an author’s 
expression; facts and ideas within a work are not protected.”); Nat’l Comics Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett 
Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1951) (“[A] copyright never extends to the ‘idea’ of the 
‘work’ . . . .”); Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995); Conan 
Props., Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 353, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“One of the first rudiments of 
intellectual property is that no one may copyright an idea.”); Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 530 F. 
Supp. 1187, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Burgunder, supra note 27, at 272 (“[C]opyrights cover expressions, 
but not ideas . . . .”); Cameron Hutchison, Insights from Psychology for Copyright’s Originality 
Doctrine, 52 IDEA 101, 109 (2012) (“Copyright subsists in the expression of a work and not the ideas 
or facts which underlie it.”); Martin, supra note 36, at 268, 270 (“[C]opyright . . . accords no protection 
for ideas. . . . [I]t provides absolutely no protection for ideas.”); John M. Olin,”Recoding” and the 
Derivative Works Entitlement: Addressing the First Amendment Challenge, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1488, 
1491 (2006); Rennie, supra note 16, at 54 (“[C]opyright protection does not protect ideas.”); Saval, 
supra note 34, at 410 (“[C]opyright protection does not extend to an idea.”); Said, supra note 63, at 782. 
But see DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (praising a 
“creative effort” that “fashion[ed] . . . ideas”); King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 535 (2d 
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protect the “originat[or of] ideas”129 is not permitted under the 
Lanham Act, but this leaves open the implication that it might be 
protected under the Copyright Act, which is simply not true.130 Other 
courts have noted this implication and carried forth the confusion. 131 
Additionally, stating that the Lanham Act is referring to the 
physical goods is imprecise because not all marks protected by the 
Lanham Act refer to physical goods.132 Many of the commercial uses 
that the Lanham Act is seeking to protect from confusion never 
involve physical goods in any way, shape, or form.133 
Dastar increased the muddled relationship between trademark law 
and copyright law. Dastar did not say that a work in the public 
domain cannot gain extra protection through trademark law.134 
Nevertheless, some courts and parties read Dastar in exactly that 
way.135 This impulse is understandable; courts prior to Dastar 
                                                                                                                 
Cir. 1924) (discussing the infringement of a “copyrighted idea”); Steven D. Jamar, Crafting Copyright 
Law to Encourage and Protect User-Generated Content in the Internet Social Networking Context, 19 
WIDENER L.J. 843 (2010). 
 129. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 32. 
 130. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 131. See, e.g., Radolf v. Univ. of Conn., 364 F. Supp. 2d 204, 222 (D. Conn. 2005) (“[C]opyright and 
patent laws sufficiently cover inventions, discoveries, ideas and concepts . . . . Because Dr. Radolf’s 
claim centers around his contention that he was the ‘author’ or originator of the ideas and concepts that 
underlie the DOD Grant, his Lanham Act claim necessarily fails in light of Dastar.” (internal citations 
omitted)); Monilisa Collection, Inc. v. Clarke Prods., Inc., No. 6:11-CV-360-ORL-31GJK, 2011 WL 
2893630, at *2 (M.D. Fla. July 20, 2011) (“[T]he ‘origin of goods’ language in the Act refers to the 
production of the tangible goods offered for sale, and not to the authorship of any idea, concept, or 
communication embodied in those goods.”); McArdle v. Mattel Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 769, 783 (E.D. 
Tex. 2006); Tao of Sys. Integration, Inc. v. Analytical Servs. & Materials, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 565, 
572 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
 132. See, e.g., Pro Search Plus, LLC v. VFM Leonardo, Inc., No. SACV 12-2102-JST (ANx), 2013 
WL 3936394, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2013); Bob Creeden & Assocs., Ltd. v. Infosoft, Inc., 326 F. 
Supp. 2d 876, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2004); Smith v. New Line Cinema, No. 03 Civ. 5274 (DC), 2004 WL 
2049232, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2004); Do it Best Corp. v. Passport Software, Inc., No. 01 C 7674, 
2004 WL 1660814, at *17 (N.D. Ill. July 23, 2004). 
 133. See, e.g., Do it Best Corp., 2004 WL 1660814, at *4. 
 134. Mary LaFrance, A Material World: Using Trademark Law to Override Copyright’s First Sale 
Rule for Imported Copies, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43, 71 (2014); Landau & Lewis, 
supra note 58, at 664. 
 135. See, e.g., Defined Space, Inc. v. Lakeshore E., LLC, 797 F. Supp. 2d 896, 901 (N.D. Ill. 2011) 
(“This case does not involve works in the public domain, . . . such as the Supreme Court faced in 
Dastar.”); Williams v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184–85 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Pers. 
Keepsakes, Inc. v. Personalizationmall.com, Inc., No. 11 C 5177, 2012 WL 414803, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 
8, 2012); Novaria, supra 50, at 313–14 (“[W]hen interpreted broadly, Dastar probably affects all 
uncopyrighted works and content—not merely expired copyrights.”). 
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focused on copyrighted status when debating the interaction between 
trademark and copyright law.136 However, it is not what Dastar held, 
resisting such a bright line rule. Nor did the Dastar court limit the 
Lanham Act to cases involving trademarks, which would also 
provide a bright line rule.137 Rather, Dastar held that the Lanham Act 
does not protect against confusion as to the origin of “ideas”138—
which is protected by neither trademark nor copyright.139 
Dastar noted that expanding reverse passing off to include the 
originator of “intellectual content” would cause trademark law to 
conflate with copyright law.140 The Court noted that it has “been 
‘careful to caution against misuse or over-extension’ of trademark 
and related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or 
copyright.”141 Additionally, it acknowledged that allowing a reverse 
passing off claim for the copyrighted work at issue “would create a 
species of mutant copyright law.”142 At the same time, the holding 
has left itself vulnerable to continued confusion as to exactly where 
the line between copyright and trademark is drawn to prevent this 
“mutant copyright law.”143 
For instance, the Court did not discuss whether the rationale that 
prohibits the reverse passing off claims from applying in Dastar 
would also extend to passing off claims.144 As the similar names 
imply, passing off and reverse passing off belong to the same general 
family of claims.145 As discussed, passing off is selling goods with 
                                                                                                                 
 136. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Lacour v. Time Warner Inc., No. 99 C 7105, 2000 WL 688946, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2000). 
 137. See Romero v. Buhimschi, 396 F. App’x. 224, 231 (6th Cir. 2010); Schlotzsky’s, Ltd. v. Sterling 
Purchasing & Nat’l Distrib. Co., 520 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 2008); Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. 
Culbro Corp., 399 F.3d 462, 478 (2d Cir. 2005); Zyla v. Wadsworth, 360 F.3d 243, 251 (1st Cir. 2004). 
But see Bretford Mfg., Inc. v. Smith Sys. Mfg. Corp., 419 F.3d 576, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that 
Dastar requires a trademark harm given the Court’s focus on the goods’ origins). 
 138. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003) (concluding that 
the reverse passing off cause of action did not apply “to the author of any idea, concept, or 
communication embodied in those goods”) (citing 17 U.S.C.§ 202). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 33. 
 141. Id. at 34 (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See 1-1 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 1.01(B)(1)(e), 
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another’s trademark on them; reverse passing off is selling someone 
else’s goods with your trademark on them.146 Commentators have 
disagreed about whether Dastar also affects passing off claims 
because of this interrelationship and Dastar’s silence on passing 
off.147 
In many well-known passing off cases decided prior to Dastar, 
courts have endorsed the idea of confusion of authorship of a creative 
good sounding claim in trademark law.148 For example, in addition to 
copyright infringement, in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting 
Companies, Monty Python was entitled to bring a claim under the 
Lanham Act based on American Broadcasting Company (ABC) 
“passing off” work as Monty Python’s own work.149 Courts rely on 
Gilliam in the continued survival of the false designation of 
“sponsorship” claims if a work has been altered,150 but it is difficult 
to see how the rationale behind Gilliam differs from the rationale 
behind the reverse passing off claim in Dastar: confusion about who 
made a creative good. Commentators have noted that reading Dastar 
as overturning Gilliam would provoke an “earthquake” in the law,151 
but the Dastar reasoning could be interpreted to provoke just that sort 
of earthquake.152 
                                                                                                                 
LEXIS (2015). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. § 1.01(D)(2); see also Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1216 (E.D. 
Cal. 2004). 
 148. See Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); 
LaFrance, supra note 134, at 72. 
 149. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 24–25 (2d Cir. 1976); see also Jaeger v. Am. Int’l 
Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
 150. Museum Boutique Intercont’l, Ltd. v. Picasso, 880 F. Supp. 153, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
 151. See David Nimmer, The Moral Imperative Against Academic Plagiarism (Without a Moral Right 
Against Reverse Passing Off), 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 43 (2004). 
 152. See Rebecca Tushnet, Dastar and design patent, REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (Sept. 12, 2014, 
11:43 AM), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2014/09/dastar-and-design-patent.html; see also Register of 
Copyrights: Hearing on H.R. 4586 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intell. Prop. of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Marybeth Peters) (“[T]he 
longstanding understanding prior to Dastar [was] that section 43(a) is an important means for protecting 
the moral rights of attribution and integrity.”). 
23
Lantagne: The Copymark Creep
Published by Reading Room, 2016
482 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
 i. The Problem with the Focus on the Physical Goods 
The Dastar court noted in dicta that reverse passing off would 
have succeeded as a claim if Dastar had bought some of the 
videotapes “and merely repackaged them as its own.”153 The Dastar 
court was referring to the purchase of the physical videotapes 
themselves because the Court went on to state that what really 
happened here was a copying of the copyrighted work on that 
physical videotape, followed by “arguably minor” modifications.154 
This apparently placed the focus on the physical good that was the 
videotape, not the show contained upon it. 
However, some courts interpreted Dastar’s language as a reference 
to a copyright infringement idea of failing to transform.155 The 
district court in Defined Space v. Lakeshore East, for instance, 
declined to dismiss a Lanham Act claim because the defendant fit 
into Dastar’s dicta exception when it “took the plaintiff’s photos and 
repackaged them as their own without revision.”156 The district court 
agreed that Dastar’s dicta was “directly on point.”157 Dastar’s dicta 
exception was not about the amount of revision; however, it was 
about the physical good itself.158 
The modern world’s goods are increasingly not tangible, which 
makes the Dastar decision difficult for courts to apply. The 
separation of physical tangible goods and the intellectual property 
wrapped up in those goods is not as straightforward as the Dastar 
decision implied.159 For instance, the Central District of California 
was faced with the question of whether the plaintiff would be 
                                                                                                                 
 153. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003). 
 154. Id.; see also Aagard v. Palomar Builders, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1218 (E.D. Cal. 2004) 
(acknowledging that the Lanham Act still applies to “tangible products”). 
 155. Defined Space, Inc. v. Lakeshore E., LLC, 797 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 156. Id. (quoting Cable v. Agence France Presse, 728 F. Supp. 2d 977, 981 (N.D. Ill. 2010)). 
 157. Id. at 901. 
 158. See San Jose Options, Inc. v. Ho Chung Yeh, No. CV 14-00500-KAW, 2014 WL 1868738, at *5 
(N.D. Cal. May 7, 2014); Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1181, 1185 (C.D. 
Cal. 2014). The Defined Space court itself notes that other courts have disagreed with its reading of 
Dastar. See Defined Space, 797 F. Supp. 2d at 901 n.2 (citing Agence France Presse v. Morel, 769 F. 
Supp. 2d 295, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
 159. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d 648, 652 (D. Del. 2006) 
(debating whether the product at issue was a physical seed or the genetic traits of that physical seed). 
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considered the “author” of digital images, foreclosing a Lanham Act 
claim, or the “printer / publisher” and thus the originator of the 
images, permitting a Lanham Act claim.160 The Southern District of 
New York found a “motion picture” to be a physical good, while the 
screenplay the motion picture was based on was not a physical 
good.161 
Computer software is the most visible category of this problem 
because computer software is almost never physical. Therefore, when 
courts try to decide whether Dastar forecloses a Lanham Act claim 
with regard to computer software, they seem to focus, like the 
Defined Space court, on the degree to which the program was 
changed. A Lanham Act claim was allowed where the competitor did 
little more than change the coding for the opening “splash screens” of 
the program.162 However, where the computer program was further 
altered so that the Lanham Act allegations involved where the 
program had been “derived” from, the court dismissed the Lanham 
Act claims as foreclosed by Dastar.163 
The instinct to examine the extent of the “plagiarism” is 
understandable because courts are naturally more comfortable with 
condemning more verbatim copying.164 However, it is attempting to 
create an artificial distinction. The dichotomy between physical 
goods and the intellectual basis of the goods does not work for a 
product, like computer software, that is never a physical good. Courts 
instead equate an unchanged computer program with a physical 
good.165 If that is the case, however, then why is an unchanged poem 
not considered physical good, too?166 Even more damning, the 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Pro Search Plus, LLC v. VFM Leonardo, Inc., No. SACV 12-2102-JST (ANx), 2013 WL 
3936394, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2013). 
 161. Smith v. New Line Cinema, No. 03 CIV. 5274 (DC), 2004 WL 2049232, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
13, 2004). 
 162. Do It Best Corp. v. Passport Software, Inc., No. 01 C 7674, 2004 WL 1660814, at *17 (N.D. Ill. 
July 23, 2004). 
 163. Bob Creeden & Assocs., Ltd. v. Infosoft, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 876, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 164. Courts have used the word “plagiarist” interchangeably with “infringer.” See, e.g., Nat’l Comics 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 165. See Do It Best, 2004 WL 1660814, at *17. 
 166. See Pers. Keepsakes, Inc. v. Personalizationmall.com, Inc., No. 11 C 5177, 2012 WL 414803, at 
*4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2012). 
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Dastar court explicitly found that plagiarism was not a cause of 
action in the first place.167 In fact, it was this resistance to plagiarism 
as a cause of action that required the plaintiffs in Dastar turn to 
trademark law instead. Without a right of attribution recognized in 
copyright law, the plaintiffs’ recourse had to be to trademark law. 
In light of Dastar’s preoccupation with physical goods, some 
courts have distinguished the Lanham Act’s prohibition of false 
authorship claims on goods from false authorship claims on services, 
the latter of which these courts conclude are permitted.168 For 
instance, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Gensler v. 
Strabala overturned a lower court’s dismissal of Lanham Act claims 
based on the Dastar precedent.169 In that case, Gensler asserted that 
Strabala falsely claimed to be the architect who designed several 
buildings.170 Copyright law protects architecture,171 and arguably 
architecture is embodied in the goods of the building, much as the 
copyrighted creativity behind Crusade in Europe was embodied in 
the goods of the videotapes.172 However, the Gensler court 
disregarded the existence of the buildings and viewed the issue as 
being one of architectural services, whose origins were 
misrepresented.173 This altered the entire analysis and permitted the 
Lanham Act cause of action.174 A similar case in Puerto Rico 
permitted a Lanham Act claim on false allegations of architectural 
design without discussing Dastar.175 However, other courts have 
disagreed that Dastar requires any distinction between goods and 
services at all.176 
                                                                                                                 
 167. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003). 
 168. See id. at 31–32. 
 169. Gensler v. Strabala, 764 F.3d 735, 737 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 170. Id. at 736–37. 
 171. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (2012). 
 172. See also EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 63 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (noting that “the musical composition is the product” in the same way that buildings are the 
product in architecture). 
 173. Gensler, 764 F.3d at 737. 
 174. The Gensler court concluded that no copyright claim would have been possible, so a Lanham 
Act claim was the only cause of action left to the plaintiff. See id. 
 175. See Landrau v. Solis Betancourt, 554 F. Supp. 2d 102, 109 (D.P.R. 2007). 
 176. See Sidem, S.A. v. Aquatech Int’l Corp., No. 10-81, 2010 WL 2573882, at *8 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 
2010). 
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 ii. The Language Problem 
In addition, Dastar dealt entirely with a cause of action under 
§ 43(a)(1)(A),177 focusing on the “origin” language.178 However, 
courts have attempted to carry Dastar’s reasoning over to causes of 
action under § 43(a)(1)(B), a section of the statute dealing with the 
“nature, characteristics, [and] quality” of the goods, rather than with 
the origin.179 In order to remain consistent with the Dastar holding, 
courts determine that the authorship of the good is not part of its 
nature.180 While this makes some logical sense with the Dastar 
decision,181 it does so at the expense of common sense; there are few 
authors who would agree that authorship is unrelated to the nature of 
their goods. In fact, other courts in dicta have listed things like 
“original . . . artist” of a karaoke recording as being related to the 
nature, characteristics and quality of the good,182 and the relationship 
of the original artist to a karaoke recording is, at its heart, one of 
authorship.183 Courts prior to the Dastar decision seemed to agree 
with the idea that the clarity regarding authorship of the “good” was 
important.184 Indeed, courts even found that a lack of clarity would 
cause irreparable harm.185 
The jurisprudence in the wake of Dastar is therefore characterized 
by a great deal of technical hair splitting. One district found that 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003). 
 178. Likewise, Dastar leaves open the question of how copyright infringement interacts with a 
dilution cause of action. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., No. 11cv0191-IEG (BLM), 2011 WL 
3203117, at *8 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011). 
 179. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) (2012). 
 180. See Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten U.S.A., Inc., 556 F.3d 1300, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2009); M. Arthur 
Gensler, Jr. & Assocs., Inc. v. Strabala, No. 11 C 3945, 2012 WL 600679, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 
2012); Smartix Int’l Corp. v. MasterCard Int’l LLC, No. 06 CV 5174(GBD), 2008 WL 4444554, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2008); Thomas Publ’g Co. v. Tech. Evaluation Ctrs., Inc., No. 06 Civ. 
14212(RMB), 2007 WL 2193964, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2007); Antidote Int’l Films, Inc. v. 
Bloomsbury Publ’g, PLC, 467 F. Supp. 2d 394, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 181. See Baden, 556 F.3d at 1308 (“To find otherwise . . . is contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of Dastar.”). 
 182. Sybersound Records, Inc. v. UAV Corp., 517 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 183. See id. 
 184. See, e.g., Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding that using a 
current photograph of a singer when the singer had recorded the songs years earlier was sufficient to 
deceive people regarding the goods and support a Lanham Act cause of action). 
 185. See id. 
27
Lantagne: The Copymark Creep
Published by Reading Room, 2016
486 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:2 
improper use of the words “proprietary” or “exclusive” was 
preempted by the Copyright Act, but not improper use of the word 
“innovative,”186 while on appeal the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit found the dispute nothing more than “an attempt to avoid the 
holding in Dastar . . . .”187 In a different case, the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania concluded that an allegation that defendant’s product 
had originally been created by plaintiff were barred by Dastar, but an 
allegation that defendant stole plaintiff’s product was not barred by 
Dastar.188 
Meanwhile, faced with a brochure that was largely plagiarized, a 
district court in Colorado found one Lanham Act cause of action 
precluded by Dastar, but allowed another to go forward because the 
unactionable misrepresentation of whose brochure it was might 
create confusion that the plagiarized party had approved the 
brochure.189 Thus, the false designation of origin claim was thrown 
out as a result of Dastar’s preoccupation with origin.190 But the false 
designation of sponsorship or approval claim, based on the same 
activities with the brochure, survived.191 
b. Sherlock Holmes and the Case of the Copymark Creep 
One of the most notable recent copyright cases involved the 
copyright status of the famous detective Sherlock Holmes.192 This 
case illustrates the fact that the Dastar decision did little to directly 
address the root of the copymark issue. 
Sherlock Holmes has long been a copyrighted work with a 
confusing status.193 The character of Holmes appears in fifty-six 
                                                                                                                 
 186. Baden, 556 F.3d at 1306–07. 
 187. Id. at 1307. 
 188. See ZS Assocs., Inc. v. Synygy, Inc., No. 10-4274, 2011 WL 2038513, at *11 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 
2011). 
 189. See MDM Grp. Assocs., Inc. v. ResortQuest Int’l, Inc., No. 06-cv-01518-PSF-KLM, 2007 WL 
2909408, at *7 (D. Colo. Oct. 1, 2007). 
 190. Id. at *8. 
 191. Id. at *7; see also Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 235, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
 192. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 497 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 193. E.g., Lavigne, supra note 16, at 342–43. 
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stories and four novels published between 1887 and 1927.194 The 
final ten stories remain under copyright, while the rest of the stories, 
and all of the novels, are in the public domain.195 
Leslie Klinger was editing an anthology called A Study in 
Sherlock: Stories Inspired by the Sherlock Holmes Canon.196 The 
stories contained in the anthology were “inspired by” the Sherlock 
Holmes stories and usually contained Holmes and his partner Dr. 
Watson as characters.197 When the Conan Doyle Estate, holders of 
the copyright on the ten final stories, learned of the anthology, they 
contacted Klinger’s publisher and requested that he obtain a 
copyright license.198 Klinger’s publishing company paid the licensing 
fee and the anthology was published.199 
A few years later, Klinger decided to edit a second anthology of 
Sherlock-Holmes-inspired stories.200 This time Klinger’s publishing 
company balked at paying the Conan Doyle Estate’s requested 
licensing fee and left payment of the fee to Klinger.201 Klinger, 
however, refused to pay the fee, asserting that he was allowed to use 
material from all the public domain Sherlock Holmes stories, so that 
the Conan Doyle Estate could demand a licensing fee only if he was 
using material from the ten stories still under copyright.202 
The Conan Doyle Estate, at this point, confronted the crux of the 
issue: Traditional copyright law did not provide them with the level 
of protection they needed. Traditional copyright law protected the 
original elements of creative expression in the final ten stories, but 
traditional copyright law did not protect anything in the first forty-six 
stories and the four novels. Unfortunately for the Conan Doyle 
Estate, the characters of Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson appeared 
                                                                                                                 
 194. Klinger, 755 F.3d at 497. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Klinger, 755 F.3d at 497. 
 201. Id. at 498. 
 202. Id. 
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in all of the public domain materials, which seemed to leave them 
open for anyone to use. 
Therefore, in order to prevent Klinger and others from using the 
characters of Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson, the Conan Doyle 
Estate needed something more than traditional copyright. The estate 
argued that the characters were not fully complete until the final story 
was complete, so that anyone trying to use those characters would 
inevitably have to use original creative expression that was still 
copyrighted.203 The issue in the case centered on when a character 
falls into the public domain; the first time it appears, or the last time 
it appears.204 However, the debate was really about copymark. 
It is by no means an inevitable conclusion that a character such as 
Sherlock Holmes is entitled to copyright protection in the first 
place.205 “Copyright is relatively difficult to obtain for literary 
characters . . . .”206 Only distinct characters that are not stereotypes or 
stock characters can be copyrighted.207 A character that is not 
sufficiently delineated exists only as an “idea” that cannot be 
copyrighted.208 “[T]he less developed the characters, the less they can 
be copyrighted; that is the penalty an author must bear for marking 
them too indistinctly.”209 To decide otherwise would grant “a 
monopoly in a particular type of person.”210 
A character’s specific name and appearance is copyrightable and 
the copying thereof can be copyright infringement.211 Klinger 
                                                                                                                 
 203. Id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See Foley, supra note 19, at 938 (“[E]valuating whether a fictional character is a proper subject 
for copyright protection is an unavoidable threshold issue in the copyright infringement analysis.”). 
 206. Abramowicz, supra note 64, at 364. 
 207. See, e.g., Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publ’ns, 111 F.2d 432, 433–34 (2d Cir. 1940); 
Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 208. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Abramowicz, supra note 64, at 364–65. 
 211. See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014) (construing Gaiman 
v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 660 (7th Cir. 2004)). Interestingly, courts have implied that written 
characters sometimes may not become sufficiently distinctive until they are combined with a visual cue. 
See Gaiman, 360 F.3d at 660–61. The famous deerstalker cap and pipe that characterize most people’s 
visions of Sherlock Holmes are not found in the stories. See, e.g., Sherlock Holmes: A Hero for His 
Time—and Ours, DISCOVERING ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, sherlockholmes.stanford.edu/biography_ 
elusive.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2015). Nor did Holmes ever deliver the line “Elementary, my dear 
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wished, presumably, to use the name and description of Sherlock 
Holmes in the stories, but if the stories were merely “inspired” by the 
Sherlock Holmes canon, did not have a character named Sherlock 
Holmes, and merely contained a character who was a brilliant 
detective, the copyright infringement case is not nearly so clear-cut. 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit therefore properly 
treated the Conan Doyle Estate as making “arguments for enlarged 
copyright protection.”212 The court acknowledged that the original 
elements of the final ten stories still enjoy copyright protection, but 
the Conan Doyle Estate could not thereby rope in the rest of the 
stories that had entered the public domain.213 
The Conan Doyle Estate argued that refusing to give an author 
protection in a character dating from the character being 
“perfect[ed]” in the final work would destroy “incentive to improve 
the character in future work . . . .”214 “If he loses copyright on the 
original character . . . he’ll be competing with copiers.”215 This 
argument is bewildering as a matter of copyright law, because the 
copyright term lasts for the life of the author plus seventy years.216 
No author should lose copyright in an actual copyrightable character 
while he or she is alive, and therefore, no author should be competing 
with copiers. As the court acknowledged, in the particular 
circumstances of this case, Conan Doyle had been dead over eighty 
years.217 This is typical; only once an author has been dead many 
decades do you have a discussion about public domain materials.218 
At any rate, the refusal of the law to protect vague and indistinctly 
drawn characters already disincentivizes authors to take their time 
perfecting characters. 
                                                                                                                 
Watson” in the stories. See id. 
 212. Klinger, 755 F.3d at 498; see also Helfand, supra note 10, at 652 (noting the same danger in 
allowing the importation of trademark law tests to expand copyright protection “to protect against the 
use of characters that are less and less similar”). 
 213. Klinger, 755 F.3d at 501. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
 217. Klinger, 755 F.3d at 501. 
 218. Corporate authors, of course, cannot “die” in the way humans can, so they enjoy their own term 
of copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2012). 
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The Conan Doyle Estate’s arguments boiled down to matters of 
trademark law, although they were not framed that way; the Conan 
Doyle Estate wished to use Sherlock Holmes as a trademark. They 
wished to control the source from which he emanates for as long as 
they desired.219 
The Seventh Circuit indirectly acknowledged this in the final 
paragraphs of the opinion, noting that what the Conan Doyle Estate 
really sought was trademark dilution protection. The estate wanted 
the Sherlock Holmes character only used in a manner it approved, out 
of fear that otherwise deterred consumers would diminish the value 
of its property.220 But, the court pointed out, “[t]here is no 
comparable doctrine of copyright law . . . .”221 
Thus, the Sherlock Holmes case stands as a copymark case; one in 
which the copyright holder seeks to expand its monopoly through 
trademark law. However, it is also not a Dastar case, illustrating the 
major shortcoming of Dastar; the copymark problem is much more 
pervasive than a reverse passing off case on a public domain 
copyrighted work. Therefore, to the extent to which Dastar can even 
be understood as sensible precedent, it fails to address the heart of the 
copymark issue. 
D. The Danger of the Copymark Creep 
As noted, copyright is a careful balance between the monopoly 
rights of the copyright holders to exclude the uses of others, and the 
rights of the public.222 The public benefit from the copyright balance 
manifests itself in two ways. First, the public’s access to the growing 
public domain; and second, the public’s right to exercise their First 
                                                                                                                 
 219. The idea of an author trying to enjoy rights that might not explicitly belong to him has been 
endorsed not only by the conflation of intellectual property concepts that has been discussed thus far, 
but also by precedent providing authors with copyright in characters through implication in the absence 
of any express language otherwise. See Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 102 F. 
Supp. 141, 145 (S.D. Cal. 1951). 
 220. See Klinger, 755 F.3d at 503. 
 221. Id. But see DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118–19 (N.D. Ga. 
1984) (explicitly looking at trademark dilution harm in the context of evaluating a fair use defense to 
copyright infringement). 
 222. See Moffat supra note 6 at 1476–77. 
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Amendment free speech rights by engaging with copyright-protected 
works.223 
1. The Danger to the Public Domain 
Commentators have noted that copyright owners can treat their 
goods more like trademarked goods in order to win the expanded 
protection of trademark law.224 Such activity can be “an 
anticompetitive measure.”225 It is an effort to capture what they 
perceive as the more favorable trademark protection for their work.226 
Copyright protection might restrict the original expression and some 
circle of substantially similar works, whereas trademark law permits 
the copyrighted creation to be scattered throughout merchandising.227 
In this way, the copyrighted item itself becomes a trademark.228 This 
overtly lays the basis for continued protection once the copyright 
term expires.229 Indeed, the very ubiquity of this practice has swayed 
some courts to protect characters based not on law, but on the “public 
expectation that merchandise displaying elements of a fictional 
character is at least sponsored by the owner of the character.”230 
The trademark protection period has no set expiration date, unlike 
copyright law.231 The “potentially perpetual” protection period 
                                                                                                                 
 223. See id. at 1481. 
 224. See LaFrance, supra note 134, at 73. 
 225. Id. at 75; see also Arewa, supra note 16, at 292 (discussing anticompetitive use of the DMCA). 
 226. See LaFrance, supra note 134, at 73. 
 227. See, e.g., Helfand, supra note 10, at 626–27; Liu, supra note 16, at 1428; Foley, supra note 19, at 
937, 948; Pacelli, supra note 15, at 1250–51, 1264. 
 228. See Liu, supra note 16, at 1434. 
 229. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 34, at 1498. 
 230. Foley, supra note 19, at 949. 
 231. See, e.g., Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering 
the Rights of Owners, Programmers and Virtual Avatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649, 678 (2006); Foley, 
supra note 19, at 939 (“Trademark protection . . . may . . . persist in perpetuity.”); Helfand, supra note 
10, at 657; Liu, supra note 16, at 1427 (“Unlike copyright law, trademark law places no temporal limit 
on the length of protection.”); Moffat, supra note 6, at 1494 (“[T]he term of trademark protection has 
always been indefinite, with protection lasting as long as the mark is used (unless the mark becomes 
generic) . . . .”); Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 34, at 1459 (“[T]rademark protection is, in 
principle, infinite in duration.”); Laurie Richter, Reproductive Freedom: Striking a Fair Balance 
Between Copyright and Other Intellectual Property Protection in Cartoon Characters, 21 ST. THOMAS 
L. REV. 441, 467 (2009) (“[T]rademark rights do not expire as long as the mark qualifies for protection; 
therefore it is in the owner’s best interest to attempt to obtain trademark rights in conjunction with their 
copyright.”); Sander, supra note 27, at 22 (“[T]rademarks . . . can last for an unlimited amount of 
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reflects the different purpose of trademark law.232 Because trademark 
law is about protecting the consuming public from confusion rather 
than incentivizing further creativity, “there is no reason why 
trademarks should ever pass into the public domain by the mere 
passage of time.”233 Trademark law focuses on the smooth operation 
of commerce and has little interest in promoting expanded use of its 
subjects. Copyright law, on the other hand, has the opposite goal.234 
It seeks to “enrich[] . . . the public domain.”235 This is its 
constitutionally stated purpose,236 and constitutionally a copyright 
cannot be perpetual, but must only last “for limited [t]imes.”237 That 
makes trademark a more attractive protective mechanism as a 
copyright holder.238 In fact, copyright holders have even used these 
trademark ideas to justify further expansion of the copyright term 
limit itself.239 
Because trademark law is not worried about ensuring that works 
enter the public domain, there is no mechanism under the Lanham 
Act to shepherd trademarks toward the public domain.240 Therefore, 
using trademark law to cover works more traditionally covered under 
copyright permits a strangulation of the public domain.241 
                                                                                                                 
time.”); Saval, supra note 34, at 420 (“[T]he duration of a trademark is potentially perpetual . . . .”). But 
see Pacelli, supra note 15, at 1263 (arguing that copyright protection could be considered stronger if 
Congress continues to expand the term, because, unlike trademark, copyright protection cannot be lost 
through inactivity). 
 232. Helfand, supra note 10, at 637. 
 233. Id. at 657 (quoting Boston Prof’l Hockey Assoc. v. Dallas Cap. & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 
1004, 1011 (5th Cir. 1975)). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1482; see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Foley, supra note 19, at 924. 
 236. Walterscheid, supra note 21, at 239 (“The ultimate purpose of . . . copyrights in the United States 
is to enlarge the public domain of creative works by authors and inventors, thereby promoting ‘the 
progress of science and useful arts.’”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); Litman, supra note 22, at 
433. 
 237. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1481 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); Lavigne, supra note 16, at 
357; Walterscheid, supra note 21, at 241, 245. 
 238. Copyright holders have, at times, explicitly stated a belief that “copyright should last as long as 
possible.” Litman, supra note 22, at 431. 
 239. See, e.g., Buccafusco & Heald, supra note 25, at 16–17. 
 240. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
 241. See Litman, supra note 22, at 435; Saval, supra note 34, at 446; Liu, supra note 16, at 1398. 
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Disney is one of the foremost practitioners of using both copyright 
and trademark protection; although, Disney is by no means alone.242 
Commentators have noted that Disney is in favor of copyright 
extensions in order to protect “Steamboat Willie,” which is on the 
cusp of falling into the public domain.243 As others have pointed out, 
surely the many changes that Disney has instituted between 
“Steamboat Willie” and the current iteration of Mickey Mouse are 
copyrightable and would protect the current version of Mickey 
Mouse.244 But Disney wants to keep Mickey Mouse out of the fray 
altogether.245 If Steamboat Willie falls into the public domain, 
Disney is aware that an argument exists that some iteration of 
Mickey Mouse is in the public domain246—regardless of the 
occurrence of the last copyrighted use of Mickey Mouse.247 
Therefore, Disney seeks to supplement its copyright protection by 
relying on Mickey Mouse as a trademark. 
The arguments of the Conan Doyle Estate illustrate the way in 
which copyright holders want to achieve trademark protection: If 
they are continuing to license uses of Sherlock Holmes, then what is 
to stop them from continuing to expand the copyright term based on 
the last time their copyrighted character was used?248 Put that way, 
                                                                                                                 
 242. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 64, at 369; Buccafusco & Heald, supra note 25, at 7–8; 
Douglas A. Hedenkamp, Free Mickey Mouse: Copyright Notice, Derivative Works, and the Copyright 
Act of 1909, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 254, 255 (2003); Richter, supra note 231, at 451, 460–61; 
Sander, supra note 27, at 23; Dinitia Smith, Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse 
Joins the Fray, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/28/arts/immortal-words-
immortal-royalties-even-mickey-mouse-joins-the-fray.html?pagewanted=all. 
 243. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 242. 
 244. See Hedenkamp, supra note 242, at 266, 278; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 
Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 491 (2003); Liu, supra note 16, at 1441–42; 
Martin, supra note 36, at 318. 
 245. See generally Hedenkamp, supra note 242. 
 246. Some commentators have suggested that, despite Disney’s best efforts otherwise, Mickey Mouse 
is already in the public domain. See, e.g., id. at 255. 
 247. See Richter, supra note 231, at 471–72. 
 248. The appellate court noted that the Conan Doyle Estate’s argument raised “[t]he spectre of 
perpetual, or at least nearly perpetual, copyright . . . .” Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 
496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 988 F. Supp. 2d 879, 890 (N.D. 
Ill. 2013) (“The effect of adopting Conan Doyle’s position would be to extend impermissibly the 
copyright of certain character elements of Holmes and Watson beyond their statutory period . . . .”); Liu, 
supra note 16, at 1452 (predicting that “parties may attempt to lay claim to works ostensibly in the 
public domain by making small changes to a public domain work in an effort to retain or extend the 
copyright and using the resultant uncertainty to limit free use”); Foley, supra note 19, at 935. 
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the protection they sought for Sherlock Holmes begins to look not 
like copyright, but more like how we understand Mickey Mouse to 
function these days249: as a trademark that continues to receive 
protection as long as it is being used. Mickey Mouse is a well-known 
trademark; Sherlock Holmes, however, traditionally has not been 
considered one, but the copyright holder wishes that it were. 
2. The Danger to the First Amendment 
Not only does the use of trademark law in copyright analyses 
endanger the public domain, it also increases the limitations on those 
uses that would have been permitted under the copyright law regime 
of non-public-domain works. Traditionally copyright law talked very 
little about its First Amendment implications in the silencing of 
speech, relying instead on the fair use defense and the 
idea/expression dichotomy.250 But these protections can only 
properly protect in the copyright world, and they are powerless 
against trademark law concepts. 
Trademark’s “likelihood of confusion” standard presents an 
attractive emotional appeal for copyright holders to fall back on 
where copyright law might otherwise fail because of a lack of 
substantial similarity between the works.251 Copyright holders are 
drawn to the idea that confusion, in and of itself, is a harm for which 
they should be compensated.252 The copyright infringement standard, 
however, is substantial similarity, not confusion.253 
                                                                                                                 
 249. Gaiman v. McFarlane, 360 F.3d 644, 659 (7th Cir. 2004); Burgunder, supra note 27, at 258, 290; 
Landes & Posner, supra note 244, at 491; Liu, supra note 16, at 1424, 1428; Martin, supra note 36, at 
317 (“Disney was not, in fact, ever at risk of losing all of its rights to Mickey Mouse, which is a 
trademarked character.”); Moffat, supra note 6, at 1496; Pacelli, supra note 15, at 1250–51; Saval, 
supra note 34, at 441. 
 250. Matthew D. Bunker & Clay Calvert, The Jurisprudence of Transformation: Intellectual 
Incoherence and Doctrinal Murkiness Twenty Years after Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 12 DUKE L. 
& TECH. REV. 92, 95 (2014); Hollows, supra note 19, at 301–02; Martin, supra note 36, at 270, 302. 
Commentators have noted that these doctrines perform this task only semi-effectively. See Liu, supra 
note 16, at 1418. 
 251. See Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 804 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 252. See, e.g., Orange, supra note 45 (noting that copyright holders treat the elimination of confusion 
as fixing the copyright infringement problem). 
 253. Lyons, 243 F.3d at 801. 
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The “substantial similarity” test, like many of the most important 
tests in copyright, is a difficult one to articulate.254 It is “necessarily 
imprecise,”255 “one of the most uncertain questions in copyright and 
‘one which is the least susceptible of helpful generalizations.’”256 “It 
is . . . impossible to articulate a definitive demarcation that measures 
when the similarity between works involves copying of protected 
expression; decisions must inevitably be ad hoc.”257 As a result, 
copyright infringement actions are haunted by complicated and 
divisive tests involving debates over where to draw the lines between 
expression and ideas, and whether this song sounds too much like 
that song.258 
In comparison, confusion seems like an impossibly simple thing to 
measure and quantify. Indeed, it is tempting enough that appellate 
courts have used evidence of confusion to overturn trial courts’ 
rulings on substantial similarity.259 
In trademark law, most causes of action rest on a multi-factor 
likelihood of confusion test.260 In the absence of consumer confusion, 
trademark harm does not occur. 261 “In the absence of a likelihood of 
consumer confusion, a finding of trademark infringement is an 
unwarranted limitation on creativity and expression, for the 
trademark owner’s rights have not been infringed.”262 Confusion is 
thus the hallmark of trademark law.263 
                                                                                                                 
 254. Id. at 801, (“The notion of [substantial] similarity can be a slippery one . . . .”); Hutchison, supra 
note 128, at 112; Rennie, supra note 16, at 67. 
 255. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 256. Leslie A. Kurtz, The Independent Legal Lives of Fictional Characters, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 429, 
472 (1986). 
 257. Shaw, 919 F.2d at 1356 (citing Sid & Marty Television Prods. Inc., v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 
F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 258. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1480 (“The basic test of substantial similarity for infringement—
which is vital for the public to evaluate whether its conduct is permissible—is, unfortunately, ‘largely 
subjective, thus permitting the finder of fact to give effect to its intuitive judgment of the perceived 
equities in a case.’”) (quoting Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 1005 (1990)). 
 259. Lyons, 243 F.3d at 802; see also Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 246 (2d Cir. 
1983) (referring to the finding of substantial similarity and likelihood of confusion as if they are the 
same test and the same cause of action). 
 260. Lyons, 243 F.3d at 804. 
 261. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Megaupload Ltd., No. 11cv0191-IEG (BLM), 2011 WL 3203117, at *8 
(S.D. Cal. July 27, 2011) (criticizing trademark allegations for failing to ever use the word “confusion”). 
 262. Foley, supra note 19, at 946–47. 
 263. Lyons, 243 F.3d at 804; GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 
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While confusion undeniably plays a role in copyright law due to 
the danger of misrepresentation inherent in any copyright 
infringement,264 confusion is not the hallmark of copyright law in the 
way that it is in trademark law.265 The substantial similarity test does 
not necessarily hinge on confusion to the extent that trademark law 
does. Unlike trademark infringement, copyright infringement can 
exist even if no one is confused.266 
Copyright holders turn to trademark law to avoid the morass of 
debate over substantial similarity. A copyright holder can never be 
sure how a substantial similarity analysis might turn out, but a 
measure of consumer confusion is an irresistibly easy thing to set out. 
It seems to the copyright holder like a way to sneak a bright line rule 
into an arena of the law that is notoriously resistant to such rules. 
Also, it has the added bonus of sounding like something the law 
should concern itself with on a basic fairness level. 
The likelihood of confusion standard is even more appealing given 
how much it has grown in recent years.267 Recourse to likelihood of 
confusion means that a copyright holder need only prove that some 
percentage of consumers (in trademark law, the percentage can be as 
low as ten percent)268 was confused at some point in time, however 
briefly, even if that confusion was later dispelled.269 
The danger in allowing the importation of such a standard, 
however, is that it diminishes the protective power of traditional 
copyright measures that promote the proliferation of expressive uses 
                                                                                                                 
2000) (“The likelihood of confusion is the central element of trademark infringement . . . .”); Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1984); Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. 
Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980); Meyer v. Rodex Sales & Servs., LLC, No. CV 05-
176-S-MHW, 2006 WL 3355004, at *9 (D. Idaho Nov. 16, 2006) (“A key purpose of the Lanham Act is 
avoidance of confusing the public.”); Helfand, supra note 10, at 636 (“Proof of consumer confusion is 
the most crucial element of a trademark infringement cause of action.”); Kozinski, supra note 63, at 468 
(“[A]t the core of trademark law is the issue of confusion.”); Sander, supra note 27, at 21; Saval, supra 
note 34, at 420 (“Proof of consumer confusion is the crucial element of a trademark infringement cause 
of action . . . .”). 
 264. See Lacour v. Time Warner Inc., No. 99 C 7105, 2000 WL 688946, at *8 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 
2000). 
 265. See, e.g., Waldman Publ’g Corp. v. Landoll, Inc., 43 F.3d 775, 781 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 266. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1364–65 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 267. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 268. Id. at 775. 
 269. Liu, supra note 16, at 1429. 
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in support of the public’s First Amendment free speech rights.270 For 
instance, under copyright law, a fair use defense might protect a 
parody.271 However, consumer confusion might conceivably still 
exist and act to work against the application of fair use, finding 
trademark infringement where copyright infringement would not 
have existed.272 
If copyright holders cannot prove confusion, they still have the 
concept of tarnishment or blurring to turn to.273 These ideas—that 
particular conduct is damaging one’s reputation or strength in the 
marketplace274—are trademark concepts found in the dilution cause 
of action, that copyright holders seek to use to gain more control in 
how their copyrighted works can be used by others.275 There are 
many First Amendment implications in the protection provided, 
especially by tarnishment law, because it provides a rights holder 
with the ability to silence a speaker who it finds offensive.276 Using 
this law, copyright holders can chip away at the amount of protection 
provided to parody.277 
                                                                                                                 
 270. See Sander, supra note 27, at 1; Foley, supra note 19, at 953. 
 271. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012). 
 272. See Helfand, supra note 10, at 653 (noting that “one might defend against a copyright 
infringement action by asserting a fair use parody and yet not be able to disprove consumer confusion”); 
Saval, supra note 34, at 423 (discussing that copyright holders can “use trademark law to circumvent 
what copyright law may allow under fair use”); Foley, supra note 19, at 954; Sander, supra note 27, at 
21. 
 273. Foley, supra note 19, at 951 (“[D]ilution provides broad protection in the absence of a likelihood 
of consumer confusion . . . .”). 
 274. Liu, supra note 16, at 1438. 
 275. See Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014); Galerie Furstenberg 
v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282, 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Frederick Warne & Co. v. Book Sales Inc., 481 
F. Supp. 1191, 1199 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Helfand, supra note 10, at 627; Dennis S. Karjala, Harry 
Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative Work, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 35–36 (2006); Liu, 
supra note 16, at 1438; Jacqueline Lai Chung, Note, Drawing Idea from Expression: Creating a Legal 
Space for Culturally Appropriated Literary Characters, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 936 (2007). 
 276. See Gardner, supra note 53. 
 277. See DC Comics Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., 598 F. Supp. 110, 118–19 (N.D. Ga. 1984); 
Gardner, supra note 53. 
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II. TURNING TO FAN COMMUNITY PRACTICES TO BALANCE 
COPYMARK CREEP 
Fan communities define themselves by reference to a copyrighted 
work whose rights belong to other entities.278 As such, they 
inevitably confront copyright issues regularly as a fact of their very 
existence. 
While all fan communities do not speak with one voice, a number 
of recurring characteristics and attitudes have coalesced into a 
recognizable set of unwritten rules.279 These rules attempt to provide 
some protection of the rights of the creator of the original 
copyrighted work while simultaneously encouraging a flourishing 
creative atmosphere among the fan creators engaging with the work. 
In short, these rules seek the traditional copyright balance.280 
Fan communities have developed largely independent of formal 
legal advice and detailed statutory knowledge because these 
communities have normally been located only at the fringe of 
mainstream creative culture.281 These communities did not set out to 
rewrite copyright law.282 Rather, the balance they struck developed 
organically and intuitively from their understanding of how the law 
works.283 They were worried about what would be “fair,” not 
necessarily what was legal. In their actions, they instinctively 
recognized the copymark creep and sought to limit its effects.284 
                                                                                                                 
 278. See, e.g., a blackpanther, What Fanfic is and isn’t, OBSERVATION DECK (Dec. 2, 2013, 8:24 
AM), http://observationdeck.kinja.com/what-fanfic-is-and-isnt-509492028 (defining “fandom” as a 
group of people who “spend their free time interacting with the canon source in ways that aren’t 
standard, i.e. more than just watching, reading or playing something deciding ‘hey, I kinda like that’ 
[sic]. It’s fanfic writers, fanartists, cosplayers, readers of fanfiction, people who hang around the forums 
discussing all the details and so on.”). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Henry Jenkins, Citizen Fan: An Interview with Filmmaker Emmanuelle Wielezynski-Debats 
(Part Two), CONFESSIONS OF AN ACA-FAN THE OFFICIAL WEBLOG OF HENRY JENKINS (Oct. 6, 2014), 
http://henryjenkins.org/2014/10/citizen-fan-an-interview-with-filmmaker-emmanuelle-wielezynski-
debats-part-two.html (quoting Emmanuelle Wielezynski-Debats as referring to fandom as “folk 
culture”). 
 282. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1473. 
 283. Id. at 1461. 
 284. Id. 
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The rules established by fan communities betray an attraction to 
bright line rules; in the vacuum left behind by copyright precedent, 
those most affected by copyright have found their own way. And, 
given the trademark character of most copyright discussions, it is 
unsurprising that fan communities have unconsciously drawn these 
bright line rules from trademark law—not copyright.285 In this way, 
fan communities have used trademark law concepts to offset the 
damage done by these same concepts to the public domain and free 
speech balance of copyright. 
A. Fan Community Understanding of Trademark Law 
There does not seem to be a conscious understanding of trademark 
law concepts as opposed to copyright law concepts because fan 
communities are composed primarily of laypeople as opposed to 
lawyers. However, the practices of fan communities can be readily 
understood in a trademark law context—more so than a copyright 
law context. 
1. Embracing Trademark’s Likelihood of Confusion Standard 
Much as copyright holders appear to like trademark’s confusion 
standard, fan communities have followed; if there is no confusion as 
to who is responsible for which part of a piece of creativity, fan 
communities support that piece of creativity.286 
Fan creators frequently place disclaimers in front of their works, 
emphasizing what they have “borrowed” from other people and what 
is their own work.287 This permits them to define ownership (“I own 
this, but J.K. Rowling owns that”) while continuing to use that which 
                                                                                                                 
 285. See wtfzurtopic, Comment to Was Fanfic any Fifferent in the Olden Days, TUMBLR.COM (Jan.25, 
2015), http://nonasuch.tumblr.com/post/109152651195/was-fanfic-any-different-in-the-olden-days. 
 286. See jennlynnfs, FANFICTION, https://www.fanfiction.net/u/873760/jennlynnfs (last visited Nov. 
14, 2015). 
 287. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1534; wtfzurtopic, supra note 285; see also Orange, supra note 45 
(reporting that the parties decided the solution to alleged copyright infringement was a disclaimer); 
Natasha Simonova, Fan fiction and the Author in the Early 17th Century: The Case of Sidney’s Arcadia, 
TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS & CULTURES (2012), http://journal.transformativeworks.org/index.php/ 
twc/article/view/399/314. 
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they acknowledge does not belong to them. The thinking seems to be 
that the disclaimer dispels any confusion that might exist.288 But, as 
has been discussed, confusion is a trademark law concept; it has little 
effect on a copyright infringement analysis.289 In fact, the concept of 
disclaimers is more prevalent in trademark law.290 
Fans also encourage using proper “sourcing,” providing original 
links or otherwise crediting the original in some way.291 Fan 
communities recognize the value of the very attribution right 
dismissed by the Supreme Court in Dastar, betraying how much they 
view copyright through a trademark lens.292 
This desire to make sure that consumers are informed about what 
type of creativity they are getting shows up in other fan practices, 
too, like the mania for “trigger warnings” and “tagging,” to give 
people a clear view of what is coming in a fanwork.293 
The rules that fan communities have established set forth when fan 
creators have gone too far, and generally that runs along the 
trademark law “passing off” fault.294 Taking someone’s work, either 
wholesale or as unmistakable inspiration, without providing proper 
credit, is frowned upon by fan communities.295 Notably, such a 
practice would lead to consumer confusion as to where the work in 
question originated (hence why it is prohibited by trademark law). 
 
                                                                                                                 
 288. See Orange, supra note 45 (“They put these disclaimers on so kids . . . don’t confuse . . . .”). 
 289. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1534. 
 290. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1315 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
 291. See, e.g., jennlynnfs, supra note 286; Kambria Rain, FANFICTION, 
https://www.fanfiction.net/u/1688000/Kambria-Rain (last visited Nov. 14, 2015); George deValier, 
FANFICTION, https://www.fanfiction.net/u/2348750/George-deValier (last visited Nov. 14, 2015); 
Blanket Permission to Podfic, FANLORE, http://fanlore.org/wiki/Blanket_Permission_to_Podfic (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2015); REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/fandomnatural/wiki/index (last visited Nov. 
14, 2015); room_317, Chapter 1, LIVEJOURNAL (Apr. 28, 2012, 10:01 PM), http://room-
317.livejournal.com/. 
 292. See, e.g., jennlynnfs, supra note 286; Kambria Rain, supra note 291. See also Dastar Corp. v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 36 (2003) (likening passing off as applied in a 
copyright context to plagiarism). 
 293. See wtfzurtopic, supra note 285. 
 294. See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36 (likening passing off as applied in a copyright context to plagiarism). 
 295. See, e.g., Kambria Rain, supra note 291. 
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2. Trademark’s Commercial—as Opposed to Creative—
Marketplace 
Fan communities also traditionally drew a clear distinctive line 
between “for profit” works and “free” works. Many works of 
fanfiction will include a statement that the writer is not making 
money off of the work.296 It is unclear if this is meant to insulate the 
writer from being sued for money that does not exist, or if there is an 
understanding that it is only “wrong” if you are making money off of 
the original content creator.297 
At any rate, trademark law, rooted in the Commerce Clause, must 
focus on the commercial aspects of the conduct in question.298 While 
commercial implications may play a role in copyright, they are not 
the prerequisite fan communities frequently treat them as. Giving 
something away for free does not insulate you from copyright 
infringement charges,299 as many fans mistakenly 
believe.300Copyright holders understandably fixate less on the 
commercial emphasis of trademark law as opposed to copyright law, 
mostly because, to them, all copyright law violations have a financial 
aspect.301 This is a consequence of the overall “copymark creep”—
the tendency of copyrighted works to function more like trademarks 
in a commercial marketplace. It is only natural that fan communities 
instinctively seize upon traditional trademark defenses in response, 
asserting their lack of commercialism to protect them. 
Nevertheless, it is true that the monetization of some fanworks has 
begun to occur;302 although in many instances it remains a hotly 
contested issue.303 For example, some people sell costume replicas to 
                                                                                                                 
 296. See wtfzurtopic, supra note 285. 
 297. See, e.g., Debora J. Halbert, The Labor of Creativity: Women’s Work, Quilting, and the 
Uncommodified Life, TRANSFORMATIVE WORKS & CULTURES 4.21 (2009), 
http://journal.transformativeworks.org/index.php/twc/article/view/41/118. 
 298. See MCCARTHY supra note 30, § 6:2. 
 299. See, e.g., Stephanie Losi, RIAA Sues Hundreds in ‘First Wave’ of War, TECH NEWS WORLD 
(Sept. 8, 2003, 3:30 PM PT), www.technewsworld.com/story/31525.html. 
 300. See Halbert, supra note 297, at 4.21. 
 301. See Foley, supra note 19, at 925. 
 302. See Falco276, Publishing Fanfictions for Profit?, FANFICTION (Dec. 5, 2013), 
https://www.fanfiction.net/topic/2872/101834311/Publishing-Fanfictions-for-Profit. 
 303. Id. 
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“cosplayers” so they can dress like their favorite characters.304 There 
has been a movement to auction off custom-made pieces of fanworks 
for various charities.305 The monetization seems especially central to 
fanartists, who will accept commissions and also sell their works as 
prints and other products.306 The rise of Kickstarter has also made the 
monetization of fanworks easier, both for pieces of fanart307 and for 
further transformative uses, like fanmade “movie” versions of 
popular pieces of fanfiction.308 As fan activities become more 
commercialized, the communities seem to be relying on the lack of 
confusion with the original content creator to protect them.309 
B. Fan Community Encouragement of Creative Activity 
In the balance between the rights of the creator and the rights of 
the public to engage with creative works, fan communities have used 
trademark law to strengthen the public side of that balance.310 Fan 
communities, attempting to narrow the copyright monopoly as much 
as possible, treat trademark law as a limiting doctrine.311 
The bright line rules established by fan communities provide for 
greater clarity and predictability, thereby lowering transaction 
costs.312 This has resulted in a general free-for-all of posting in which 
anyone can upload anything, confident that, by the standards of the 
fan communities, their work will be accepted on its own merits as 
                                                                                                                 
 304. See Search results for “Cosplay Costume,” ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/market/cosplay_costume 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
 305. See, e.g., A Fandom Auction to Help Haiti Recover, LIVEJOURNAL, http://help-
haiti.livejournal.com/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
 306. Some of this monetization is even taking place in partnership with the copyright holder. See, e.g., 
Alan Wexelblat, Makers, Fan Art, Making It Pay, COPYFIGHT (Aug. 25, 2014), 
https://www.primaryopinion.com/articles/makers-fan-art-making-it-pay . 
 307. See, e.g., Benjamin Henson, Destiny Custom Fan-Art T-Shirts, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/benjaminhenson/destiny-custom-fan-art-t-shirts (last visited Nov. 
14, 2015). 
 308. See Naomi Javor, A Finger Slip: Web Series, KICKSTARTER, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/1879289266/a-finger-slip-web-series (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
 309. See Artemis J. Potter, Comment to Publishing Fanfictions for Profit?, FANFICTION (Dec. 5, 
2013), https://www.fanfiction.net/topic/2872/101834311/Publishing-Fanfictions-for-Profit. 
 310. Liu, supra note 16, at 1428. 
 311. Id. 
 312. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1485–86. 
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long as they comply with the delineated standards.313 Therefore, the 
fan community’s emphasis on commercialism provides a bright line 
rule of predictability, leading people to feel assured of their safety in 
asserting what they wish to say. This baseline encourages a freer (and 
more free-for-all) creative dialogue.314 
Likewise, the emphasis on consumer confusion also provides 
greater clarity to the fan creator (it also does to the copyright 
holder).315 As long as the fan creator is careful to provide proper 
credit, then the fan creator feels secure in his or her acceptance in the 
fan community.316 
This environment leads to an ongoing tumble of transformative 
uses of the works of others.317 Permission is often sought before such 
uses are made318—striking given the fact that most fan creators do 
not seek permission before engaging in their initial acts of 
creation.319 However, permission also appears to be freely given, 
given the profusion of ongoing uses that exist.320 It is clear that fans 
believe creativity to be a dialogue.321 They ask permission frequently 
because, comfortable in the delineated rules of their community, they 
are confident that permission will be freely given and will be 
withheld only occasionally. When permission becomes costly to seek 
and uncertain to achieve, as it does in the more commercial 
“copymark” world, it acts as a stumbling block that discourages 
creativity.322 
The overall effect of the fan community emphasis on trademark 
law in traditionally copyright dictated regimes is an advancement of 
the fan community goals: encouragement of creative collaboration 
between the creator and the consumer. Fan communities have used 
                                                                                                                 
 313. See, e.g., jennlynnfs, supra note 286; George deValier, supra note 291. 
 314. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1546. 
 315. Liu, supra note 16, at 1428. 
 316. See, e.g., jennlynnfs, supra note 286; George deValier, supra note 291; Blanket Permission, 
supra note 291; REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/fandomnatural/wiki/index (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
 317. Blanket Permission, supra note 291. 
 318. See, e.g., jennlynnfs, supra note 286; George deValier, supra note 291. 
 319. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1462. 
 320. Blanket Permission, supra note 291. 
 321. Id. 
 322. See Liu, supra note 16, at 1418; Lee, supra note 57, at 1532. 
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their bright line rules influenced by trademark law to achieve the sort 
of flourishing creativity that is copyright’s ultimate purpose. 
III. USING THE INTERNET TO SAVE COPYRIGHT 
The domain of copyright—books, movies, art, television—is part 
of the larger culture. It is inevitable that social norms cropup around 
these shared creative experiences, especially considering the muddle 
of legal and statutory norms around them. 
In a world where copyright holders appear drawn to a “copymark” 
idea, the folk wisdom of fan communities should not be dismissed. 
Copyright is a “carefully crafted bargain.”323 “In theory, when an 
author obtains the protections of copyright law, society gets 
something in exchange, including the increased production, 
disclosure, and dissemination of creative works, the right to make fair 
use of the copyrighted works, and the right to independently create 
identical or substantially similar works.”324 This is an extremely 
delicate balance,325 and the importation of trademark law concepts 
into copyright law tips it; meaning that “the public may be deprived 
of some of these bargained-for benefits.”326 Copyright holders 
understandably support this shifting of balance, because they 
benefit.327 However, when that bargain is shifted too far and the 
public fails to benefit from copyright, then copyright protection itself 
becomes “unjustified.”328 In fact, if trademark law is imported too 
                                                                                                                 
 323. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989), quoted in Dastar 
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003); see also Moffat, supra note 6, at 
1475 (referring to “the copyright bargain” and warning against “disrupting” it); Burgunder, supra note 
27, at 287; Foley, supra note 19, at 924. 
 324. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1516. 
 325. Lavigne, supra note 16, at 316. 
 326. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1516; see also Litman, supra note 22, at 433 (“We give out exclusive 
rights in return for, among other things, the dedication of the work to the public after a limited period of 
time has expired.”). 
 327. Richter, supra note 231, at 472 (“The union of trademark, copyright, patent and other intellectual 
property protections tends to benefit corporation and owners because creators reap all the 
benefits . . . .”). 
 328. Foley, supra note 19, at 925. 
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heavily into copyright law, it can be said that “the public receives 
nothing in exchange.”329 
This problem is illustrated by looking at the character of Santa 
Claus. Commentators have noted that it is difficult to pinpoint an 
“author” of the Santa Claus character; “[t]he name Santa Claus has 
been traced back as far as 1773, while settlers brought the Duge 
legend of Sinter Klaas to New York in the seventeenth century.”330 
Therefore, these commentators say, there is no need to worry much 
about how long individual drawings of Santa Claus might be 
protected by copyright, because no one would ever be able to own 
the idea of Santa Claus.331 
This only works, though, if Santa Claus drawings stay copyrighted 
instead of importing trademark law concepts. Given the state of the 
law today, it is not a difficult leap to imagine that Thomas Nast, 
whose nineteenth-century drawings of Santa Claus established much 
of the modern vision of him we all possess today,332 might try to 
claim an expanded protection using trademark law instead of 
copyright. It might be laughable to imagine Santa Claus being owned 
by copyright,333 but it is disturbingly plausible to imagine Santa 
Claus being owned under a “copymark” idea. 
The attitude of fan communities can be understood as an attempt to 
recalibrate the balance. Permitting the bargain to remain upset 
without correction skews the ability of copyright to achieve its 
creativity-encouraging goals.334 Fan communities, representing the 
“public” side of the copyright bargain, have instinctively found ways 
to tip the scales back to a more even distribution.335 Therefore, there 
is normative value to be gleaned in their reliance on the bright line 
rules of trademark. 
                                                                                                                 
 329. Id. at 957. 
 330. Martin, supra note 36, at 269. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 268–69. 
 334. Moffat, supra note 6, at 1474. 
 335. Richter, supra note 231, at 472 (“[T]he union [of trademark, copyright, patent, and other 
intellectual property protections] should protect individuals and those who wish to parody and fairly use 
the [works] . . . .”). 
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What fan communities are doing is reacting to developments: in 
the law, in the real world, and by copyright holders.336 These 
reactions might be subconscious or instinctive, rather than deliberate, 
but they should be valued for exactly that reason.337 Fan communities 
should not be accused of distorting copyright law in a vacuum.338 
Rather, this distortion should be seen as a correction of other 
distortions.339 Without the fan communities’ organic bright line rules, 
the delicate balance of copyright would shift too far in favor of the 
copyright holders and too far away from the promotion of 
progress.340 
When copyright law looked more traditional rather than an 
iteration of trademark law, the defenses built into the statute may 
have made sense. However, as copyright law has continued to expand 
to resemble a hybrid of copyright law and trademark law, the 
traditional copyright defenses have begun to make less sense. 
Moreover, the resistance to bright line rules that initially seemed to 
encourage more speech has resulted in the opposite. 
The fair use defense—copyright law’s primary free speech 
protection—is messy and unpredictable.341 Indeed, some courts have 
referred to it as “seem[ing] arbitrary.”342 It “leav[es] little guidance 
for users of copyrighted works on whether a particular use is fair.”343 
Its reliance on the injunction as a remedy—especially the preliminary 
injunction344—results in extensive stifling of speech.345 Many 
speakers will simply choose not to take the “gamble” of engaging in 
                                                                                                                 
 336. See generally Jamar, supra note 128; Lee, supra note 57. 
 337. See generally Jamar, supra note 128; Lee, supra note 57. 
 338. See Lee, supra note 57, at 1483. 
 339. See generally Jamar, supra note 128; Lee, supra note 57. 
 340. Jamar, supra note 128, at 870. 
 341. Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (“It is not always easy to say 
where the line should be drawn between the use which for such purposes is permitted and that which is 
forbidden.”); Gardner, supra note 53; Goold, supra note 19, at 893; Lewis, supra note 19, at 268; 
Thomas Plotkin & Tarae Howell, “Fair is Foul and Foul is Fair:” Have Insurers Loosened the 
Chokepoint of Copyright and Permitted Fair Use’s Breathing Space in Documentary Films?, 15 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 407, 408, 434 (2009); Richter, supra note 231, at 473 (“The fair use exception to the Copyright 
Act is vague as there is no clear standard to determine whether a use should be deemed fair or unfair.”). 
 342. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 102 F. Supp. 141, 148 (S.D. Cal. 1951). 
 343. Lee, supra note 57, at 1480. 
 344. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 145, § 14.06(A)(1)(b) (2015). 
 345. See id. § 14.06(C)(1)(c) (2015). 
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speech that might be found infringing based on vague and nebulous 
standards.346 And those that do choose to speak may not have a 
chance to do so before a judge orders them to stop through an 
injunction.347 
The power imbalance between many copyright holders and many 
members of fan communities also illustrates the necessity of bright 
line rules.348 Many fan community members have little understanding 
of how the law works, so they have little understanding of how it can 
operate to protect them.349 For instance, a Tumblr post explaining 
that the DMCA can operate to protect artists whose work is stolen 
was greeted with delighted surprise by Tumblr users who evidently 
did not know about the possibility.350 But it also led to further 
confusion, as Tumblr users portrayed a misunderstanding of what to 
do with this information: The Tumblr DMCA page is used to address 
copyright infringement involving other websites, not “re-posters,” 
but there appeared to be confusion on this front.351 
This situation is exacerbated where precedent is unclear and legal 
status is uncertain, because copyright holders often exploit this 
uncertainty to assert more than they are entitled to, hoping for 
acquiescence on the part of the would-be speaker. The Klinger case 
detailed earlier in this Article makes clear that Klinger thought he 
had the right to use the public domain aspects of the Sherlock 
Holmes characters.352 However, when confronted by the Conan 
Doyle Estate, the publishing company capitulated and paid instead of 
                                                                                                                 
 346. Richter, supra note 231, at 452; see also Bunker & Calvert, supra note 250, at 126; Lee, supra 
note 57, at 1480 (characterizing the fair use defense as “act[ing] almost as a trap”); Monika Isia 
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effects.”). 
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fighting,353 which perpetuated further years of confusion on the 
copyrighted status of Holmes and led to years of work that was in the 
public domain being treated as if it was not.354 The resulting limit to 
the public domain is a societal cost that copyright does not support.355 
Even if one is confident that one’s speech will not be infringing 
based on fair use, the lack of clear standards makes the probability 
that a copyright holder will still complain about such a use high. For 
instance, a one-man show entitled “My Princess Bride” received a 
cease-and-desist letter apparently alleging copyright infringement of 
the movie The Princess Bride, the book The Princess Bride, or 
both.356 This situation was distressing to the originators of the “My 
Princess Bride” show because they had done “some research to 
ensure they weren’t infringing on copyright, and they 
were . . . ’comfortable and confident it was fair use . . . .’”357 
Nevertheless, in the face of the cease and desist letter, the show’s 
creators canceled it, in part based on “caution and prudence,” even 
though they continued to believe the show was permissible under fair 
use, but also because many venues refused to mount the show with 
its cloud of copyright infringement allegations.358 
Given the unpredictability of fair use cases, it would be difficult to 
deter such actions by copyright holders based on sanctions. If there is 
a good faith basis to believe in the action—and the lack of clear-cut 
rules makes such a basis likely—then the conduct is acceptable.359 
The fair use defense is usually available in situations where its 
expense is prohibitive: 
                                                                                                                 
 353. Id.; see also Jasiewicz, supra note 346, at 170 (“The trend toward settlement . . . seems to 
indicate that many artists are not willing to take the risk of litigation when there is so much uncertainty 
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[T]he fair use defense is available only after the defendant 
begins to defend himself in court, after he, as a possibly 
innocent infringer, is pressured to spend money on a 
lawyer. This of course makes the fair use exception 
virtually untenable to well-intentioned individuals who 
happen to not be wealthy.360 
As a result, the current state of the law incentivizes copyright 
holders to attack all uses of their works, with little downside and 
tremendous upside, exploiting both the power imbalance and the 
convenient lack of bright line rules.361 
Dismissing these issues as the inevitable consequences of 
copyright law may have made sense in a world where copyright 
looks more like traditional copyright. But in a world where the 
copyright holders want copyright to look more like trademark, the 
fan community importation of trademark law concepts to check this 
expansion seems necessary. 
If copyright holders wish to expand their monopoly in a way 
similar to trademark, then the limitations that have developed in 
trademark law to check trademark monopolies should likewise be 
imported.362 Importing such limitations will recalibrate the copyright 
balance from its current lopsided state. If copyright’s built-in 
limitations have ceased to be effective because of the rise of the 
hybrid “copymark” idea,363 then further limitations must be found, 
and turning to trademark law makes sense. For instance, the 
trademark law practice of disclaimers should be allowed to protect 
fan communities’ copyrighted activities364—just as fan communities 
                                                                                                                 
 360. Richter, supra note 231, at 469; see also Goold, supra note 19, at 893. 
 361. See Arewa, supra note 16, at 293; Jamar, supra note 128, at 844–45; see also Gardner, supra 
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at 1430, 1439. 
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hope that they do, and just as some copyright holders themselves 
have encouraged.365 The fan community emphasis on non-
commercialism fits nicely into the “non-commercial” exemptions 
built into trademark law.366 
It makes sense that the fan communities rely on bright line rules 
about commercialism and consumer confusion. As discussed, the 
result of the resistance to bright line rules in traditional copyright 
analyses can actually lead to a discouragement of speech.367 There 
are no legal precedents concerning traditional fan activities, which 
provides fan communities with even less guidance than other 
speakers.368 The fan community introduction of greater predictability 
through its reliance on trademark law concepts leads to the 
encouragement of more speech, as the fan community experience has 
proven.369 
This increased clarity also permits fewer latent aesthetic judgments 
of the artistic merit of the work in question. Judges in trademark 
cases are rarely called upon to determine whether the trademark in 
question is a good one that ought to be allowed to exist, as they 
regularly are called upon to do in copyright cases with regard to 
creative works.370 
Fan community norms do not endorse a radical “free commons” 
idea where no one has ownership and no one will be able to make 
money. Fan communities have a concept of both ownership and 
monetization, respect both concepts, and have even begun to engage 
in both. 
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For instance, people who offer downloads of other people’s works 
seldom charge for it.371 When fans do monetize their works, they 
seem to believe that they have added something of value to the work 
that permits them to charge for it—and the people who buy seem to 
agree. Maybe it is time to recognize that value explicitly, rather than 
devaluing it the way current copyright law does. An 
acknowledgement of the creep of trademark into copyright and the 
rise of the hybrid “copymark” idea would be the first step to 
legitimizing wider, more diverse forms of creativity. 
CONCLUSION 
Copyright holders, in recognition of the overall trajectory of their 
creative industries and how copyrights are being used, have 
succumbed to the temptation to import trademark law ideas into the 
copyright law context. Courts have also yielded to this temptation, 
leading to an overall blurring of the line between copyright and 
trademark that looks more similar to “copymark.” Where courts have 
tried to clarify copyright and trademark again, they have tended to 
only further muddy the waters between them. 
Copyright law seeks to balance the rights of the creator against the 
rights of the public to engage with the creative work. Trademark law, 
however, merely seeks to protect the marketplace. The importation of 
trademark ideals into copyright runs the risk of stifling free speech 
and strangling the public domain, tipping the copyright balance. The 
judicial resistance to bright line rules in the copyright arena has only 
resulted in aiding this lopsided balance. 
To the extent that we still believe the copyright balance is one we 
wish to maintain, the solution need not reinvent the wheel. Rather, 
we can look to fan communities for the ways in which they have 
sought to check the expanding copyright monopoly and protect the 
balance. Fan community practices promote the traditional goals of 
copyright, encouraging a flourishing creative community. Their use 
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of trademark defenses to do this, in a world where copyright has 
begun to look more like trademark, should be supported. After all, if 
speech would not be considered harmful in a trademark law context, 
surely it should not be stifled in a copyright law context. The 
promotion of creative progress at least requires that. In this way, the 
Internet can save copyright. 
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